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1. INTRODUCTION: CURRENT SITUATION
At the end of 1988, the external debt of developing countries was
approximately $420 billion.' United States banks own about twenty
percent of this debt.' As of 1986, the total projected interest service for
these countries through 1991 is expected to be $145.6 billion.' A recent
analysis indicates that developing countries now receive less in com-
bined aid each year from the World Bank and the International Mone-
tary Fund than they are paying in interest and principal on outstand-
ing debt to the two organizations." Seven years after Mexico's finance
minister announced its fiscal emergency, signaling the onset of the
global debt crisis,5 the international financial crisis has hardly
improved.6
This Comment will first look at the magnitude and implications of
the debt crisis. It will then evaluate debt/equity swaps as a mechanism
for reducing bank exposure in developing countries while encouraging
* J.D., 1989, University of Pennsylvania Law School; B.A., 1985, Harvard
University.
1 Riding, Latins Want Bush to Help With Debts, N.Y. Times, Nov. 29, 1988, at
A14, col. 3; see generally A Lesson From Chile, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 7, 1987, at
87-90 (discussing external debt and debt swapping). As of December 31, 1986, Brazil's
debt was $110.3 billion; Mexico's debt was $100.3 billion; Argentina's debt was $51.7
billion; Venezuela's debt was $34.1 billion; Chile's debt was $21.5 billion. Truell &
Murray, Debt Breakthrough, Wall St. J., Dec. 30, 1987, at 1, col. 1.
2 See generally Truell & Murray, supra note 1, at 4 (showing chart of ten biggest
U.S. bank lenders to Mexico, with amounts outstanding in billions of dollars as of Sept.
30, 1987, and loan-loss reserves for developing countries).
I A Lesson From Chile, supra note 1, at 87-90; Mellon Bank projections of Bank
for International Settlements, World Bank, and country Central Bank data. These
figures are based on the assumptions that between 1987 and 1991, OECD (Organiza-
tion for Economic Cooperation and Development) real growth averages 2.6% per year,
nominal oil prices average $18/barrel, and LIBOR (London Interbank Offering Rate)
averages 7.6% over the period. Id.
' Lewis, A Shift in Third World Funds' Flow, N.Y. Times, Feb. 11, 1988, at
D1, col. 3.
1 W. GREIDER, SECRETS OF THE TEMPLE 517 (1987); see generally J. MAKIN,
THE GLOBAL DEBT CRISIS 18 (1984); Broad, How About a Real Solution to Third
World Debt?, N.Y. Times, Sept. 28, 1987, at A25, col. 2.
8 Alpern and Emerson, Making Life Easier for Debtor Nations, N.Y. Times, Feb.
7, 1987, at A27, col. 1; Riding, Why Brazil Gave Up on Debt Moratorium, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 22, 1988, at D8, col. 5.
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economic growth and privatization in these economies. Next, the Com-
ment will consider the policies behind bank regulation in this area and
the role of regulation as perceptions of international debt have changed.
The August7 and February' Amendments to Regulation K, which lib-
On August 18, 1987, 12 C.F.R. §211.5(0 was amended as follows:
(f Investment made through debt-for-equity conversions.
(1) Permissible Investment. In addition to an investment that may be
made under other provisions of this section, a bank holding company may
acquire up to and including 100 percent of the shares of (or other owner-
ship interest in) a foreign company if:
(i) The shares are acquired from the government of an eligible country or
from its agencies or instrumentalities;
(ii) The shares are acquired by conversion of sovereign debt obligations of
the eligible country either through a direct exchange of debt obligations or
a payment for the debt in local currency, the proceeds of which are used to
purchase the shares;
(iii) The shares are held by the bank holding company or its subsidiaries,
provided however that such shares may not be held by a U.S. insured
bank or its subsidiaries;
(iv) The shares are divested within five years of acquisition unless the
Board extends such time period for good cause shown but no such exten-
sions may in the aggregate exceed five years; and
(v) An investment shall be made under this paragraph in accordance with
the investment procedures of paragraph (c) of this section and shall be
subject to paragraph (b)(3)(i)(A) and (B) of this section.
(2) Definitions. For purposes of this paragraph:
(i) An "eligible country" means a country that, since 1980, has restruc-
tured its sovereign debt held by foreign creditors; and
(ii) "Investment" shall have the meaning set forth in §211.2(i) of this part
and, for purposes of this paragraph, shall include loans or other extensions
of credit by the bank holding company or its affiliates to a company ac-
quired pursuant to this paragraph.
(3) Conditions.
(i) Any company acquired pursuant to this paragraph shall not bear a
name similar to the name of the acquiring bank holding company or any
of its affiliates; and
(ii) Neither the bank holding company nor its affiliates shall provide to
any company acquired pursuant to this paragraph any confidential busi-
ness or other information concerning customers that are engaged in the
same or related lines of business as the company.
Amendments to Regulation K; 52 Fed. Reg. 30,914 (1987). For a general discussion of
Regulation K, see, Mortimer and Slade, Foreign Securities Activities of US Banks,
INT'L FIN. L. REV., June 1987, at 15.
1 On February 24, 1988, 12 C.F.R. §211.5(f) was again amended to read as
follows:
(0 Investments made through debt-for-equity conversions.
(1) Definitions. For purposes of this paragraph:
(i) "Eligible country" means a country that, since 1980, has restructured
its sovereign debt held by foreign creditors, and any other country the
Board deems to be eligible;
(ii) "Equity" includes common stockholder's equity and minority interests
in consolidated subsidiaries, less goodwill;
(iii) "Investment" has the meaning set forth in §211.2(i) of this regulation
and, for purposes of the investment procedures of this paragraph only,
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eralize the framework in which banks can engage in debt/equity swaps
shall include loans or other extensions of credit by the bank holding com-
pany or its affiliates to a company acquired pursuant to this paragraph;
(iv) "Loans and extensions of credit" means all direct and indirect ad-
vances of funds to a person made on the basis of any obligation of that
person to repay the funds.
(2) Permissible investments. In addition to investments that may be made
under other provisions of this section, a bank holding company may make
the following investments through the conversion of sovereign debt obliga-
tions of an eligible country, either through direct exchange of the debt
obligations for the investment or by a payment for the debt in local cur-
rency, the proceeds of which are used to purchase the investment.
(i) Public sector companies. A bank holding company may acquire up to
and including 100 percent of the shares of (or other ownership interests
in) any foreign company located in an eligible country if the shares are
acquired from the government of the eligible country or from its agencies
or instrumentalities.
(ii) Private sector companies. A bank holding company may acquire up to
and including 40 percent of the shares, including voting shares, of (or
other ownership interests in) any other foreign company located in an eli-
gible country subject to the following conditions:
(A) A bank holding company may acquire more than 25 percent of the
voting shares of the foreign company only if another shareholder or con-
trol group of shareholders unaffiliated with the bank holding company
holds a larger block of voting shares of the company;
(B) The bank holding company and its affiliates may not lend or other-
wise extend credit to the foreign company in amounts greater than 50
percent of the total loans and extension of credit to the foreign company;
and
(C) The bank holding company's representation on the board of directors
or on management committees of the foreign company may be no more
than proportional to its shareholding in the foreign company.
(3) Investments by bank subsidiary of bank holding company. Upon ap-
plication, the Board may permit an investment to be made pursuant to this
paragraph through an insured bank subsidiary of the bank holding com-
pany where the bank holding company demonstrates that such ownership
is necessary due to special circumstances such as the requirements of local
law. In granting its consent, the Board may impose such conditions as it
deems necessary or appropriate to prevent adverse effects, including
prohibiting loans from the bank to the company in which the investment is
made.
(4) Divestiture.
(i) Time limits for divestiture. The bank holding company shall divest the
shares of or other ownership interests in any company acquired pursuant
to this paragraph (unless the retention of the shares or other ownership
interest is otherwise permissible at the time required for divestiture)
within two years of the date on which the bank holding company is per-
mitted to repatriate in full the investment in the foreign company, but in
any event within 15 years of the date of acquisition.
(ii) Report to Board. The bank holding company shall report to the Board
on its plans for divesting an investment made under the paragraph no
later than 10 years after the date the investment is made if the investment
may be held for longer than 10 years and shall report to the Board again
two years prior to the final date for divestiture, in a manner to be pre-
scribed by the Board.
(iii) Other conditions requiring divestiture. All investments made pursu-
1988]
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for their own accounts, will be examined as a reflection of this change
in perception. Next, the Comment will analyze specific provisions of
the Amendments in light of their goals and practical effect. The Com-
ment will evaluate the effectiveness of the Amendments, balancing reg-
ulatory goals of safety and prudence with market realities.
2. BACKGROUND: THE EMERGENCE OF FINANCIAL TROUBLE
The debt of lesser-developed countries ("LDCs") is problematic
for many reasons. First, the substantial amount of LDC debt held by
U.S. banks presents great risk to the banking system.' Data from 1982
revealed that claims on developing countries of the nine largest U.S.
commercial banks"0 totaled $30.5 billion, 112.5% of their assets." If
ant to this paragraph shall be subject to paragraphs (b)(3)(i)(A) and (B)
of this section requiring prompt divestiture (unless the Board upon appli-
cation authorizes retention) if the company invested in engages in imper-
missible business in the United States.
(5) Investment procedures.
(i) General consent. Subject to the other limitations of this paragraph, the
Board grants its general consent for investments made under this para-
graph if the total amount invested does not exceed the greater of $15 mil-
lion or one percent of the equity of the investor.
(ii) All other investment shall be made in accordance with the procedures
of paragraph (c) of this section requiring prior notice or specific consent.
(6) Conditions.
(i) Name. Any company acquired pursuant to this paragraph shall not
bear a name similar to the name of the acquiring bank holding company
or any of its affiliates.
(ii) Confidentiality. Neither the bank holding company nor its affiliates
shall provide to any company acquired pursuant to this paragraph any
confidential business information or other information concerning custom-
ers that are engaged in the same or related lines of business as the
company.
Amendments to Regulation K, 53 Fed. Reg. 5,363 (1988).
9 Meltzer, International Debt Problems 8 (July 1986) (unpublished abstract
available from Department of Economics, Carnegie-Mellon University); Statement by
Mellon Bank Corp. to the Subcommittee on International Finance and Monetary Pol-
icy of the U.S. Senate 2 (Apr. 2, 1987), [hereinafter Mellon Bank Senate Letter]. See
also Truell & Murray, supra note 1, at 4, col. 2 (noting that "Moody's Investors
Service has said it is considering downgrading the credit ratings of 11 major U.S. banks
because of shaky foreign loans"); S.& P. Cuts 5 Bank Ratings, N.Y. Times, Feb. 2,
1988, at D5, col. 4 (reporting that the rating for some forms of credit was downgraded
at Bank America, Chase Manhattan, Chemical (New York), First Chicago and Manu-
facturer's Hanover).
'0 These banks are: Citicorp, Manufacturers Hanover Corp., Bank America
Corp., Chase Manhattan Corp., Chemical New York Corp., J.P. Morgan & Co.,
Bankers Trust New York Corp., First Interstate, and Security Pacific. Nash, Plan
Could Stall Banking Mergers, N.Y. Times, Feb. 1, 1988, at D8, col. 2; Berton, Audi-
tors Press Banks to Bite Bullet on Foreign Loans, Wall St. J., June 8, 1987, at 6,
col.1; see also Bennett, Nation's Biggest Banks Had Worst Year in 1987 Since the
Depression, N.Y. Times, Feb. 16, 1988, at D5, col. 1.
" J. MAKIN, supra note 5, at 18.
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these loans "went bad" through default on only half of their debt, 2 the
six largest banks in the United States could go bankrupt. 3 If even $10
billion went bad (an amount less than that owed by Mexico alone),
36% of shareholders' equity in these banks would be in jeopardy."' The
banking system is thus vulnerable in two related areas: the exposure of
bank assets and earnings to a major default or series of defaults; 5 and
the need for banks to continue substantial lending to debtor countries in
order that the interest on the debts might be repaid."6
The debt imposes severe political, economic, and social hardships
on debtor countries. 17 The ability of debtor countries to pay debts de-
pends upon government revenues, which in turn depend on the tax
base. 8 Debtor countries are compelled to devote most of their export
12 J. MAKIN, supra note 5, at 19; cf. Feinberg, Restoring Confidence in Interna-
tional Credit Markets, UNCERTAIN FUTURE: COMMERCIAL BANKS AND THE THIRD
WORLD, 3, 5 (1984)(stating that exposure of these banks in only 6 major debtor na-
tions averaged about 184% of their shareholders' equity.)
Id.; W. GREIDER, supra note 5, at 433.
J4 j. MAKIN, supra note 5, at 18.
' Meltzer, supra note 9, at 8.
A Mexican default would invite the collapse of the American banking sys-
tem, starting at the top. Nervous investors and money managers would
rush to pull their large deposits out of any banks with heavy exposure on
foreign loans, and the panic would likely spread worldwide - a global run
on the largest multinational banks. In theory, the Fed and other central
banks of the industrial world could come to the rescue with massive loans
to the Citibanks that were losing their liquidity - in effect, pumping up
the money supply to save the banking system. This was not a theory any-
one wished to test.
W. GREIDER, supra note 5, at 484.
Defaults are considered unlikely for several reasons. First, default would risk ac-
cess to trade credits and additional international finance. Second, debtor countries are
presently offered just enough new trade credits to make their economic situations beara-
ble, while reminding them of the harsh penalty of default. Third, countries that are
making debt-service payments maintain the hope of obtaining more favorable interest
rates and maturity terms for rescheduled loans. Fourth, it might be possible for U.S.
courts to obstruct a debtor nation's trade or international transactions should the debtor
default. Finally, respect for the integrity of contracts, both internationally and as a
precedent for the system within the debtor country, might deter default. Feinberg,
supra note 12, at 11. See also Riding, Brazil's Reversal of Debt Strategy, N.Y. Times,
Feb. 22, 1988, at D1, col. 3. (discussing the costs of Brazil's debt moratorium); Rohter,
Economy on Brink in Panama, N.Y. Times, Feb. 22, 1988, at D8, col. 1 (discussing
Panama's debt moratorium and its general political and economic environment).
"e Meltzer, supra note 9, at 8; McDougall, Shifting Sands, THE BANKER, Nov.
1987, at 121; Mellon Bank Senate Letter, supra note 9, at 2.
1'7 W. GREIDER, supra note 5, at 520; Farnsworth, 3d World's Prospects Called
Poor, N.Y. Times, Jan. 19, 1988, at D1, col. 6.
1" See J. MAKIN, supra note 5, at 251; see also Meltzer, supra note 9, at 2
(stating that a solution arises when debtor countries return to the marketplace, borrow
and pay matured debt and service interest charges. To do this they must earn enough
dollars (or other valuable exchange) from exports to pay for imports of goods and ser-
vices to service the outstanding debt and to finance net capital flow. Net capital flow =
19881
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earnings to debt-servicing, leaving little for economic development.19
High interest rates and low growth rates2" have made the burden of
debt servicing increasingly heavy.21
Attempts to close the gap between interest rates and economic
growth through heavier taxes (either directly or through inflation)22
place serious hardships on an already burdened population.2 3 Austerity
programs that aim to lower interest rates, decrease imports and expand
exports may succeed in their immediate goals, boosting foreign ex-
change, but confront similar social and political opposition. 4
net new borrowing + net direct investment - net capital flight.)
19 W. GREIDER, supra note 5, at 550; see Bailey and Watkins, Mexico's Dilemma,
N.Y. Times, Dec. 29, 1987, at 24, col. 2.
20 J. MAKIN, supra note 5, at 252-53; From 1970 to 1979, interest rates on long-
term private debt for debtor countries ranged from 5.1% to 8.2%. From 1980 to 1984,
the interest rates ranged from 7.8% to 12.5% for these same countries. Although inter-
est rates have since declined, domestic growth rates in debtor countries have also de-
creased. If interest rates remain moderate and real economic growth increases, the debt
service burden will be less harsh. Layman & Kearney, Debt for Equity: A Solution to
the LDC Debt Crisis? (pt.1), J. COM. BANK LENDING, Jan. 1988, at 33, 40.
1 W. GREIDER, supra note 5, at 664. In 1983, Latin American countries owed
about $22 billion in interest on commercial bank debt, while receiving only about $7
billion in net new bank loans. Feinberg, supra note 12, at 10: "[J]uxtaposing interest
payments and credit flows reflects more accurately the immediate impact of interna-
tional capital markets on a country's external payments"; if interest rates are high, this
outflow will increase. Id. at 11. See also, e.g., Solarz, One Way to Shore Up Filipino
Democracy, N.Y. Times, Feb. 22, 1988, at A19, col. 3. In the Philippines, the foreign
debt is $29 billion. This required the Philippines to pay over $1 billion more in debt
service payments to foreign creditors than it received in new assistance. With 70% of
the people living below the poverty line, and per capita income below two dollars a
day, this net loss of capital is a significant impediment to economic growth. Id.
22 J. MAKIN, supra note 5, at 253.
21 Id. at 239-41, 253.
The social chaos that accompanies hyperinflation and unbearable tax bur-
dens would result in political upheaval and, thereafter, new governments
that almost by definition would be committed to repudiation of what
would be termed 'illegitimate' debts of an 'oppressive' regime that had
pressed too hard to wring the last peso, cruzeiro, or bolivar out of its citi-
zens and, in doing so, made those currencies worthless.
Id. at 253. See also Feinberg, supra note 12, at 9, 10 (noting that many Latin Ameri-
can governments are under increasing political pressure to negotiate deals that force the
banks to "share the burden of adjustment"); Colon, Sharing the Burden of Latin Debt,
N.Y. Times, Apr. 16, 1987, at 23, col. 1 (stating that the U.S. must reduce debt service
burdens while enhancing long-term growth).
24 L. MALKIN, THE NATIONAL DEBT 87 (1987) (discussing IMF riots); see also
J. MAKIN, supra note 5, at 239-41 (discussing the international turmoil over the inter-
national debt crisis in debtor nations).
For poorer countries . . . [the debt] produced an era of domestic misery, a
steady and unrelenting grinding down of economic aspirations . . . For
the average citizens . . . economic life began to resemble a hopeless tread-
mill. They would see their real standard of living steadily decline as they
worked to pay off their nation's old debts. Only the debts did not get
smaller.
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The debt crisis also distorts economic policies and trade patterns.
In the early 1980's, Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker strived to
lower interest rates in the United States, pushing the domestic economy
into a severe recession. The LDC export markets consequently dried
up, and commodity prices began to fall dramatically as supply exceeded
demand. 5 That meant a drastic fall in economic output and real in-
come for LDCs."6 Additionally, the strong dollar and the austerity pro-
grams that restricted imports in LDCs reduced the market for Ameri-
can goods abroad.
27
The debt has also had a substantial influence on U.S. monetary
policy and bank regulation (which in turn' affect the economy), as the
Federal Reserve Board's goal of "managing the debt crisis"" and "sav-
ing the money-center banks"2" has assumed top priority in U.S. eco-
nomic policy.30
Finally, the debt has distorted the structural relationship between
the banks, the government, and the debtor countries. 1 The magnitude
of the debt and the inability of debtor countries to finance even the
interest payments has placed an artificial strain on the negotiating pro-
W. GREIDER, supra note 5, at 520.
25 W. GREIDER, supra note 5, at 415.
28 Id.
[I]f the U.S. economy did not begin to expand, then the debt problems of
the less-developed countries would multiply. America was the major mar-
ket that bought exports from those debtor nations, but when America was
in contraction, its purchases from abroad contracted too. If Americans did
not start buying exports again from Mexico or Brazil or the others, there
was no way those countries would ever find the income to keep up with
their mounting debt payments.
Id. at 504.
27 W. GREIDER, supra note 5, at 521.
If Latin America was compelled to accept austerity, if the debtor nations
were forced to restrict their imports and save their money to pay off the
banks, then those nations could not buy tractors and grain and appliances
and all the other goods they purchased from America in prosperous times.
Austerity in Brazil and Argentina meant higher unemployment in Michi-
gan and Ohio. Falling living standards in Mexico and Peru meant de-
pressed farm incomes in Iowa and Kansas.
See Meltzer, supra note 9, at 5.
28 W. GREIDER, supra note 5, at 521.
29 Id.
3o Id.
" See Memorandum from Michael Chamberlin, Shearman & Sterling, to Partici-
pants in the Working Seminar on Debt Equity Exchanges 1 (Oct. 13, 1987) (available
from Michael M. Chamberlin, Shearman & Sterling, New York City) [hereinafter
Working Seminar] (discussing the "inflexible and unwieldy web of complex multi-
party contractual arrangements" resulting from "consolidated restructurings"). Today,
the focus has shifted toward restoring flexibility in the contractual arrangements be-
tween debtors and creditors. Id.
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cess. To some extent, each party must let its actions be dictated by those
of the other party. The debtor countries, as bankrupt nations, must not
only forego the normal expectations of rising prosperity in order to pay
the banks, but must continue borrowing to maintain interest pay-
ments. 2 The banks are not only pressured to reschedule the loans 3 in
order to realize some return, but are also, because of the need for regu-
latory support, locked into a reliance on Washington. 4 The. symbiotic
relationship 5 thus created is itself dependent on third party interven-
tion to lift the stalemate.
Although there are no simple solutions3" to the debt problem, the
financial community, together with the debtor countries, has developed
innovative mechanisms to reduce the debt. One such device is the debt/
equity swap.37 The Fed's recent Amendments to Regulation K modify
the permissible foreign investments of banks made through debt/equity
swaps." This facilitates bank participation in debt/equity swaps.
3. THE DEBT/EQUITY SOLUTION
A debt/equity swap is a financial mechanism through which ex-
ternal debt is exchanged for equity in a foreign enterprise.39 In the
32 W. GREIDER, supra note 5, at 520.
33 See Brainard, More Lending to the Third World? A Banker's View, UNCER-
TAIN FUTURE: COMMERCIAL BANKS AND THE THIRD WORLD 31 (1984) (noting that
most bank lending to rescheduling countries is "involuntary" since refinancings and
new loans are necessary for the debtor countries to make interest payments. A more
desirable situation occurs when banks can make individual, uncoerced lending
decisions).
34
For all their vigorous rhetoric about the glories of the free market and
financial deregulation, the money-center banks would not get out of this
mess unless the government stepped in and rescued them. As the IMF lent
huge sums to the debtor nations to keep them going, the taxpayers of the
United States and other industrial nations were effectively assuming the
obligations on behalf of the banks. The more that the public treasuries
lent to Mexico and the others, the safer would be the managers and share-
holders of Citibank, Morgan Guaranty, Chase and Chemical and the
others.
W.GREIDER, supra note 5, at 520-21.
" Comment, Give Me Equity or Give Me Debt: Avoiding a Latin American Debt
Revolution, 10 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 89 (1988).
38 The objectives of all parties in dealing with the debt crisis should be to restore
the creditworthiness of the debtor countries, to strengthen confidence in the interna-
tional capital markets, to attain conditions that will allow debtors to service their debts
while resuming economic growth, and to create international financial structures that
will facilitate a gradual renewal of sound lending by the commercial banks. Feinberg,
supra note 12, at 3, 4.
37 See infra notes 39-85 and accompanying text.
38 See supra notes 8-9.
31 The debtor country, unable to pay its debts in dollars, is often able to offer its
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context of LDC debt/equity programs, the swap functions in the fol-
lowing way."° An investor-either a bank, or a multinational company
or financier going through a bank-proposes an exchange of a portion
of a country's external debt for equity in a certain enterprise. The gov-
ernment of the debtor country then reviews the proposal." If approved,
the investor, if not the bank itself, buys foreign currency-denominated
debt at a discount directly from a bank or indirectly in the secondary
market."2 The bank receives a brokerage fee and commission for ser-
vice."3 The investor then presents the debt to the central bank of the
debtor country for redemption in local currency. The debt is converted
at the official exchange rate' and the central bank issues the investor
the local currency or rights to the local currency for the par amount of
creditors something in exchange for cancelling the debt. Through the mechanics of the
debt/equity program, debtor countries offer to convert limited amounts of debt, "at or
near 100% of its full principal amount, into local currency for the purpose of making
an approved investment." Working Seminar, supra note 31, at 2.
40 See generally Recent Developments International Debt: Debt-to-Equity Swaps,
28 HARV. INT'L L.J. 507 (1987); letter from John F. Lee, Executive Vice President,
New York Clearing House, to William W. Wiles, Secretary, Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, app. A (Sept. 30, 1987) [hereinafter Clearing House Letter];
Coopers & Lybrand, Debt-Equity Swaps, Bull. No. 1, Aug. 1987, at 2 (available from
Coopers & Lybrand, New York City) [hereinafter Coopers & Lybrand]. For a detailed
analysis of debt/equity conversions under the Mexican program, see Estrella, Making
the Most of Mexican DebtlEquity Swaps, INT'L FIN. L. REV. Oct. 1987, at 35; Lay-
man & Kearney, Debt for Equity: A Solution to the LDC Debt Crisis? (pt.2), J. CoM.
BANK LENDING, Feb. 1988 at 33, 39. For an analysis of the Venezuelan debt/equity
program, see Rodner, Venezuelan DebtlEquity Swap Programme, INT'L FIN. L. REV.,
July 1987, at 32. For an explanation of Argentina's debt/equity program, see Carde-
nas, Argentina's New Debt to Equity Conversion Programme, INT'L FIN. L. REV.,
Aug. 1987, at 32; Layman & Kearney, supra, at 41. For a discussion of debt/equity
conversion programs in Chile and the Philippines, see Layman & Kearney, supra, at
36-39.
41 For the criteria used by Mexico to prioritize its investment proposals, see Oper-
ating Manual for Debt Capitalization and Public Debt Substitution by Investment
(Mexico), reprinted in Council of the Americas Debt-Equity Seminar Workbook V-5
(Oct. 1987)(available from Council of the Americas, New York City) [hereinafter Op-
erating Manual].
42 The catalyst for debt/equity exchanges is the growing secondary market that
values the debt at substantially below its full principal amount. The amount of the
discount varies in each country and changes from time to time. Working Seminar,
supra note 31, at 2. The secondary market developed in part because commercial banks
wanted to diversify their portfolios by purchasing debt or trading it with other commer-
cial banks. Layman & Kearney, supra note 20, at 44. See Ollard, The Debt Swappers,
EUROMONEY, Aug. 1986, at 69, 71 (discussing the difficulty of valuing Latin American
debt on the secondary market); see also French, Swapping Debt - Just Hot Air?,
EUROMONEY, May 1987, at 115 (discussing the problems with pricing LDC debt).
4' Coopers & Lybrand, supra note 40, at 2.
"" This is either a floating rate set by currency exchanges, or a fixed rate set by
the government. See generally Hanke, Chilean Flight Capital Takes a Return Trip,
Wall St. J., Nov. 7, 1986, at 33, col. 3 (discussing the Chilean system of capital repa-
triation); see also Chile: Purchase of Foreign Debt, INT'L FIN. L. REV., July 1986, at
45 (discussing the legal changes which have facilitated the purchase of foreign debt).
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the debt, less certain discounts.45 Thus, the debtor country is able to
retire its debt, while the investor gains an equity investment in a partic-
ular enterprise.
Banks engage in debt/equity conversions in three ways.46 Banks
can act as brokers or agents, intermediaries between foreign govern-
ments and multinational companies eager to make equity investments
in developing countries.47 Second, banks, in an effort to adjust their
portfolios and limit their exposure, can sell their LDC debt on the sec-
ondary market.48 Finally, banks can exchange debt for equity invest-
ments on their own accounts. 49
3.1. Advantages of Debt/Equity Swaps
Although only a few countries have implemented debt/equity pro-
grams as a means of reducing external debt,50 the mechanism is becom-
ing extremely popular. 1 The attractiveness of the debt/equity swap
stems from the advantages it offers all parties involved.52 For banks, the
"I The discount comprises transaction fees which include: processing fees; charges
for quota rights on conversion availability; the temporary or permanent loss of interest
income on debt instruments; the use of off-market exchange rates or discounts imposed
by the central bank when providing local currency; and the discount imposed by local
financial markets when exchanging debt instruments to generate liquidity. Bentley,
Debt Conversion in Latin America, COLUM. J. OF WORLD Bus., Fall 1986, at 37, 40.
The fee charged by each debtor government also varies according to the conversion
program, the particular enterprise involved, and government policy. See Coopers &
Lybrand, supra note 40, at 2, 3. For instance, in Chile, the central bank auctions the
rights to debt conversions, while in Mexico, the debt is converted at a discounted ex-
change rate, depending on the type of company involved in the conversion. In the Phil-
ippines, a bi-level fee is levied according to the type of investment and its priority to the
country. By charging a fee, the debtor government obtains some of the benefit from the
secondary market discount. Id.
4' Regulation K, 52 Fed. Reg. 30,912 (1987).
47 Id.
49 See Berg, U.S. Banks Swap Latin Debt, N.Y. Times, Sept. 11, 1986, at D1, col.
3.
'4 Regulation K, 52 Fed. Reg. 30,912 (1987).
" These countries include: Brazil, Chile, Costa Rico, Ecuador, Mexico, the Phil-
ippines, and Argentina. Similar programs are likely to be implemented soon by other
debtor countries. Layman & Kearney, supra note 20, at 43. Even where no formal
swap program is in place, swaps can still be done on a deal-by-deal basis. See Working
Seminar, supra note 31, at 2.
51 As of 1987, Chile, Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, and the Philippines had formal
debt/equity programs. Clearing House Letter, supra note 40, app. A at 5. Ecuador,
too, introduced such a program in December, 1986, and Uruguay, Peru, Colombia,
Morocco, the Dominican Republic and Nigeria have conversion programs under study.
Bruce, Who Are DebtlEquity Swappers?, EUROMONEY, May, 1987, at 117.
52 See Recent Developments, supra note 40, at 512.
Many investors, taking advantage of the incentives associated with debt-
equity swaps, invested an estimated $2.5 billion in four countries alone in
1986.. .. Since the inception of these programs, two years ago, approxi-
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swaps offer a means to reduce their exposure through the removal of
undesirable debt.3 For tax and accounting reasons, the use of debt re-
duction through debt/equity swaps can be preferable to writing off the
losses (debt forgiveness) or simply selling the debt in the secondary
market." Other benefits include reduced exposure to default, income
mately $6 billion have been invested and bankers estimate that this num-
ber may grow to $10 billion in a year.
Coopers & Lybrand, supra note 40, at 1. See also Clearing House Letter, supra note
40, app. A; Buchheit, Converting Sovereign Debt into Equity Investments, 5 INT'L
FIN. L. REV. 10 (1986); A Lesson From Chile, supra note 1, at 88.
'3 "Debt/equity swaps offer U.S. banking organizations, and other creditors, the
opportunity to diversify assets held under extended rescheduling agreements and to in-
crease their liquidity and quality." Letter from Patrick J. Mulhern, Senior Vice Presi-
dent and General Counsel, Citicorp, to William W. Wiles, Secretary, Board of Gover-
nors of the Federal Reserve System (Sept. 29, 1987) [hereinafter Citicorp Letter]. But
see Ollard, supra note 42, at 73 (discussing internal regulations and controls on for-
eigners as drawbacks to capitalization schemes); see generally McDougall, supra note
16 (discussing the risks to banks in debt/equity swaps).
5' For a discussion of the implications of debt forgiveness, see sources cited infra
note 119. According to Rev. Rul. 87-124, 1987-2 C.B. 205, when a bank sells debt in
the secondary market, it realizes a loss which (under 26 U.S.C. §1001(a)) is the excess
of the property's adjusted basis over the amount realized by the seller. For instance, X,
a commercial bank, holds a U.S. dollar denominated debt of a foreign country. This
debt evidences a loan of $100 that X made to the debtor country. Under 26 U.S.C.
§1011(a), X's adjusted basis in the debt is $100. See 26 U.S.C. §1011(a) (1988). Y, a
domestic corporation, purchases the debt from X for $60, which is the fair market
value of similar loans to the debtor country in the secondary market outside of the
debtor country. X's sale of the debt to Y produces a loss of $40 ($100-$60).
Assume that instead of selling the debt to Y for $60, X delivers the debt to the
central bank of debtor country, which credits an account of a foreign company at the
central bank with 900 local currency ($1=10 local currency). The foreign company
then issues capital stock to X. In this situation, X will be treated as if it received 900
local currency from the central bank in exchange for the debt, then contributed the 900
local currency to the foreign company in exchange for stock in the foreign country.
Under 26 U.S.C. §1001(a), X recognizes a loss on the exchange of the debt for the 900
local currency to the extent of the excess of its adjusted basis in the debt ($100) over the
fair market value of the 900 local currency. X would thus recognize a loss of $10. X
recognizes no gain on the exchange of the 900 local currency for the stock in the foreign
company because its basis in the local currency equals the stock's fair market value.
Rev. Rul. 87-124, supra, at 206.
Under Standard 15 of the Financial Accounting Standards Board [hereinafter
FASBI, reprinted in M. MILLER, GAAP GUIDE: A COMPREHENSIVE RESTATEMENT
OF ALL CURRENTLY PROMULGATED GENERALLY ACCEPTED ACCOUNTING PRINCI-
PLES §§40.01-40.07 (1988) [hereinafter GAAP GUIDE], loans must be marked to mar-
ket when they are bought or sold:
Receipt of assets or equity: When the creditor receives either assets or
equity as full settlement of a receivable, he should account for these at
their fair value at the time of the restructuring. The fair value of the
receivable satisfied can be used if it is more clearly determinable than the
fair value of the asset or equity acquired. In partial debt payments the
creditor must use the fair value of the asset or equity received . ..
Combination of types: The creditor shall reduce his recorded investment
by the fair value of assets received.
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from the fees gained through service charges, 55 a more accurate reflec-
tion of market value on the bank's balance sheet, portfolio flexibility,
and devotion of fewer resources to the LDC debt restructurings. 56 As-
suming that the bank is swapping debt for its own account, the ability
to acquire equity in exchange for debt presents the potential for a re-
turn on the equity investment when the collectability of the debt might
be highly unlikely. 57 The debtor country might also pay out more in
foreign remittances than it previously paid for debt service,58 or pay
dividends sooner than it would have paid its debt. 59 The possession of
an equity interest in an enterprise also allows some participation in
corporate decision making and control over investment return.
The swaps are also advantageous to international financiers and
multinational companies. Often these parties have existing interests or
subsidiaries in the debtor countries. The swap mechanism allows them
to acquire debt cheaply and, when exchanged, to decrease the cost of
local currency investment.00
Id. at §§40.06-40.07.
Banks have traditionally held LDC loans at historical cost. See W. GREIDER,
supra note 5, at 549 (noting that Volcker encouraged bank examiners to treat huge
portfolios of troubled loans with special care, avoiding too strict an application of the
rules in order to avoid the necessity of large write-offs). The historical cost of an invest-
ment consists of the actual amounts paid for shares or otherwise contributed to the
capital account, measured at the exchange rate effective at the time the investment was
made. Amendment to Regulation K, 50 Fed. Reg. 39,984 (1985) (to be codified at 12
C.F.R. §211.5). Once a bank sells a portion of its debt, it must mark it to its fair
market value. See Staff Bulletin No. 73, 53 Fed. Reg. 109 (1988) (discussing "push
down" accounting method applicable to corporate debt acquisitions and sales); Ricks &
Truell, SEC Tells Banks How to Handle Mexico Debt Swap, Wall St. J., Jan. 5, 1988,
at 7, col. 2 (reporting the SEC's announced intention to apply generally accepted ac-
counting principles under which banks must mark to market assets they intend to sell
to debt/bond swaps).
15 See generally Bentley, supra note 45, at 38 (discussing potential advantages of
conversion schemes to creditor banks). Because a bank can earn a fee for acting as an
agent or a broker, it will often buy LDC debt of a particular country from other com-
mercial banks in the secondary market. The bank can thus take advantage of the sec-
ondary market discount while accumulating enough debt of a particular country to sell
to an investor. See also Berg, supra note 48, at D5, col. 1 (stating that banks profit
enormously by buying foreign debt at a discount from other banks and then redeeming
it at close to face value). The bank fees can be as much as $1 million for every $100
million swapped. Id. See L. MALKIN, supra note 24, at 126 (discussing the fees earned
and the manner in which Citicorp amassed Mexican debt for Nissan Motor Company).
56 Recent Developments, supra note 40, at 508; conversation with Anthony Tac-
cone, International Economist, Mellon Bank, Pittsburgh, Pa. (Jan. 6, 1988). But cf.
French, Mexico's Capital Idea, EUROMONEY, Sept. 1986, at 170 (noting the drawbacks
created by Mexican protectionism and rigid government controls on debt-equity swaps).
5' Bentley, supra note 45, at 38; Layman & Kearney, supra note 20, at 45.
" Recent Developments, supra note 40, at 513.
51 Mellon Bank Senate Letter, supra note 9, at 11.
'0 For an example of how the swap mechanism can benefit a multi-national cor-
poration as well as a debtor country, see Orr, Anatomy of a Swap, ABA BANKING J.,
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Debt/equity swaps can also have significant benefits for debtor
countries.6 The swaps enable debtor nations to capture some of the
discount at which their debt is selling in the secondary market.6 2 The
arrangement reduces the debt service burden, since the debt swapped
will be retired, and presents an alternative to restructuring the entire
debt.63 It also compels the investor to share in both the risks and bene-
fits of an enterprise rather than requiring the debtor to bear full risk of
failure.6" Moreover, by retiring a portion of the debt, and decreasing
the debt service burden, the creditworthiness of the country increases.6 5
The stimulation of the economy through the equity investment and the
ability of the debtor government to direct resources to development and
sectors that increase export earnings6 makes the country more attrac-
Apr. 1987, at 81. Chrysler Corp. wanted to fund a major expansion in Chrysler de
Mexico. Through Manufacturers Hanover Trust, it acquired Mexican debt through
the secondary market. It then converted the resulting $100 million into roughly $92
million worth of pesos designated for the specific project. The Mexican debt was con-
verted at the free-market exchange rate. The funds were released in three payments,
allowing the Mexican treasury gradually to absorb the shock of redeeming the dollars
with pesos. Ultimately, Chrysler funded its $100 million expansion with approximately
$60 million in pesos, while Mexico eliminated about $10 million in annual interest
payments and converted a $100 million, dollar-denominated debt into a $92 million
obligation in its own currency. Both jobs and export earnings were created, as well as
the potential for additional foreign investment. Id. See also Berg, supra note 48, at Dl,
col. 2 (describing the Nissan Motor Company's Mexican debt swap).
61 Recent Developments, supra note 40, at 512 (discussing advantages of swaps to
debtor nations). Coopers & Lybrand, supra note 40, at 3; Mellon Bank Senate Letter,
supra note 9, at 3, 13; Orr, supra note 60, at 81.
62 A. Quale, New Approaches to the Management and Disposition by Banks of
Their LDC Debt: Legal and Accounting Considerations 329 (Mar. 21, 1988)(unpub-
lished manuscript).
63 Recent Developments, supra note 40, at 508; letter from Michael E. Bleier,
Managing Counsel for Regulatory Affairs, Mellon Bank, to William W. Wiles, Secre-
tary, Board of Governors, of the Federal Reserve System (Sept. 30, 1987) [hereinafter
Mellon Bank Letter]. The interest savings from debt/equity swaps can be significant.
If only 10% of the 1986 debt to private creditors of Chile, Argentina, Mexico, Brazil,
and the Philippines were converted over the next five years, interest payments could be
cut by some $4.7 billion. Coopers & Lybrand, supra note 40, at 3. See Clearing House
Letter, supra note 40, app. A at 6 (stating that "in the short run, each 1% of outstand-
ing debt swapped for equity has the same effect as a 1% increase in the country's
exports, and each percent of the debt that is swapped into equity is equivalent to a
reduction of about 8 basis points in the rate of interest that the country has to pay on
its outstanding debt").
A basis point is one-hundredth of a percentage point. Id.
Layman & Kearney, supra note 40, at 34; Recent Developments, supra note
40, at 513.
6 See Newman, LDC Debt: The Secondary Market, the Banks, and New Invest-
ment in the Developing Countries, COLUM. J. OF WORLD Bus., Fall 1986, at 70;
Mellon Bank Senate Letter, supra note 9, at 12; Alpern & Emerson, supra note 6, at
A27, col. 5.
66 Recent Developments, supra note 40, at 513.
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tive to foreign capital."7 The country also becomes more attractive to
domestic capital that might have been invested outside the country. 8
3.2. Disadvantages of Debt/Equity Swaps
The chief drawback of the debt/equity conversions is the potential
inflationary impact on debtor economies.6 9 The exchange of "soft" or
local currency for hard currency can be inflationary if the central bank
in the debtor country prints money to provide for the local currency.7
This does not have to occur, however, because the central bank can
"sterilize" an expansionary impact through open market operations1
67 As the foreign exchange balance improves, some capital from dividends on for-
eign investment will leave the country.
[Tihe net effect should be an easing of the foreign exchange constraints as
interest payments are reduced. U.S. Commerce Department data for
American multinational corporations indicate that in general (from 1977-
1985) about 40% of dividends were repatriated from LDCs, with the re-
mainder being reinvested. Consequently, rather than being entirely an
outflow on the service account, reinvested earnings can serve to support
investment in later periods.
Kearney, Debt/Equity Conversions 3 (Mar. 1987)(available from Mellon Bank, Pitts-
burgh, Pa.) [hereinafter Debt/Equity Conversions]. In addition, business confidence in
the country's future increases, stimulating investment even from firms not participating
in the debt/equity conversions. Id. at 4 cf. French, supra note 56, at 173 (noting some
optimism that Mexico's capitalization program will attract new investment, not just
investments previously contemplated); Orme, Swaps Spur Foreign Investment in Mex-
ico, Fin. Times, Jan. 5, 1987, at 7, col. 1; R. Debs, Study Group on Alternative
Sources of Finance for Developing Countries: A Summary Report 28 (1987) (available
from the Study Group of Thirty, New York City) (discussing "additionality"); see also
Coopers & Lybrand, supra note 40, at 3 (discussing inflow of foreign capital). But cf
Recent Developments, supra note 40, at 512 (noting critics' arguments that investments
in LDCs would have been made even without the conversion schemes).
11 Recent Developments, supra note 40, at 512. Cf Hanke, supra note 44, at 33,
col. 3 (repatriation of flight capital under Chile's conversion scheme). But some coun-
tries, such as Mexico, prohibit or strictly control domestic entities or individuals partici-
pating in the conversion program. See Public Sector Debt Restructuring Agreement, cl.
5.11 (Aug. 29, 1985)[hereinafter Restructuring Agreement), reprinted in Council of
the Americas Debt-Equity Seminar Workbook V-8 (Oct. 1987) (available from the
Council of the Americas, New York City).
6'9 Clearing House Letter, supra note 51, app. A at 4; conversation with John
Simone, Vice President, Manufacturers Hanover, New York City (Jan. 6, 1988). See
also French, supra note 56, at 170; A Lesson From Chile, supra note 1, at 88; Recent
Developments, supra note 40, at 515; Debt/Equity Conversions, supra note 67, at 4.
70 Debt/Equity Conversions, supra note 67, at 4.
71 See Hanke, supra note 44, at 33, col. 5. In Chile, the external debt is ex-
changed for a local debt instrument that is then resold in the local secondary market. In
this type of conversion, there is no change in the money supply since no money has
been created. The use of local debt can increase the operating costs of the issuer of the
local debt instrument as cheaper external debt is exchanged for more expensive local
debt. Moreover, the introduction of new debt in the local secondary market can raise
local interest rates by increasing the demand for money. "[Clountries with stable capi-
tal markets ...can absorb the new debt instrument, and moderate inflation rates,
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Debt/equity conversions can also confer an unfair advantage on
foreigners and local entrepreneurs with flight capital abroad.72 The
ability to purchase debt at a discount and exchange it for local currency
at face value makes investment through foreign currency more advanta-
geous than direct domestic investment with local currency."3 Thus,
debt/equity programs have the effect of subsidizing those outside the
country to the disadvantage of local investors.
74
Many LDCs also fear loss of sovereignty as foreigners gain some
control of domestic industries.75 This is manifest in the nature of many
debt/equity programs that exempt the most indigenous or successful
enterprises from foreign participation. 76 Debt/equity conversions may
also encourage "round tripping, ' 77 by which foreign firms that would
otherwise retain earnings in a country are encouraged to extricate those
which generally reflect adequate monetary control." Coopers & Lybrand, supra note
40, at 3. Also, countries can limit the number of conversions that occur per month.
Hanke, supra, at 4.
Some LDCs have difficulty "sterilizing" the inflationary impact of debt/equity
conversions due to a monetary policy that involves keeping domestic interest rates low
and servicing large public sector deficits. Coopers & Lybrand, supra, at 4. Such coun-
tries are concerned with the possible crowding out of private debtors as the government
competes with them for funds. See Bentley, supra note 45, at 40. However, reductions
in the deficit, in loans to domestic entities, or in purchases of domestic assets, such as
government securities, can neutralize money created to purchase the debt. Clearing
House Letter, supra note 40, app. A at 4. Thus, only countries unwilling or unable to
neutralize the effects of the swaps will experience inflation. Coopers & Lybrand,
supra, at 3.
1, Coopers & Lybrand, supra note 40, at 5; Orme, supra note 67, at 7, col. 5;
Debt/Equity Conversions, supra note 67, at 6.
7' Debt/Equity Conversions, supra note 67, at 6.
7" This argument is weak in light of the existence of a secondary market for debt,
the need to repatriate flight capital, the additional resources beyond financial invest-
ment that accompanies foreign interest, and the burden of foreign liabilities. Debt/
Equity Conversions, supra note 67, at 7. See Clearing House Letter, supra note 40,
app. A at 2 n.4 (stating that the many variables that form the conversion rate discredit
the characterization of debt/equity swaps as a subsidized preferential exchange rate).
71 The fear is that debtor countries will sell their most indigenous industries, their
"csouls," to foreign investors in exchange for an outstanding debt. See L. MALKIN,
supra note 24, at 125-26 (comparing the debtor countries to the hero in Nathanael
West's novel, THE DREAM LIFE OF BALSO SNELL, who sells off arms, legs and much
else to stay alive). See Clearing House Letter, supra note 40, app. A at 4 (perceived
threat of "loss of national patrimony"). One concern is that when a foreign company
invests in a company in the debtor country, partial or total control over the enterprise
may pass to the foreign investor. Critics fear that the profit-maximizing goals of mul-
tinational companies will conflict with the development goals of the debtor country.
Accordingly, debtor governments have adopted measures to limit the control of foreign
investors. These include regulations concerning the types of investments available, the
areas of the economy where investment is prohibited, and the time period after which
divestiture is required. Layman & Kearney, supra note 20, at 41-42.
7' See Truell & McCoy, Third World Creditors Give Debt-Equity Swaps a Try,
Wall St. J., June 11, 1987, at 6, col. 2.
7 See generally Debs, supra note 67, at 35.
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earnings and reinvest them at the preferential exchange rate."8 A final
concern is the belief held by some that debt/equity conversions only
subsidize investments that would be made anyway, without attracting
new investment and fresh inputs.79
Debt/equity conversions also present potential down-side risks for
the banks. Since some of the debtor countries involved are presently
servicing their debt, the banks are exchanging a performing asset for a
nonperforming asset."0 There are also the risks associated with politi-
cally and economically unstable developing countries: nationalization,
political and social upheaval resulting in new governments with new
policies, and currency devaluations.8 " There is, too, the possibility of
economic downturn and business failure that would jeopardize share-
holder interests.8 2
It should finally be noted that debt/equity conversions can offer
only a limited solution to the LDC debt problem. There are only a
limited number of debt/equity conversion programs available in the
debtor countries. The transaction costs of the extensive process are also
very high."' Thus, the overall impact on the total amount of LDC debt
78 Id.
11 A Lesson From Chile, supra note 1, at 88; French, supra note 56, at 173;
Recent Developments, supra note 40, at 512. "[Wjithout additionality, the benefit of
substituting foreign equity or domestic debt for external debt is slight at best, since the
country could achieve most of the same ends by earmarking foreign exchange to pay off
some creditors."
Debs, supra note 67, at 28.
80 Internal Memorandum from Staff to Board of Governors, of the Federal Re-
serve 6 (Sept. 2, 1987) [hereinafter Staff Memorandum](discussing Meeting with
Bankers' Association for Foreign Trade on Debt-for-Equity Investment Issues); conver-
sation with James Keller, Manager, International Banking Applications, Federal Re-
serve (Jan. 6, 1988). See also French, supra note 56, at 168 (observing that equity is
more transferable than debt and that the banks are not undertaking the equity for long-
term reasons). "Nonperforming" is defined as having payments over 90 days in arrears.
When a loan is termed "nonperforming" a bank must subtract 6 months' interest on
the loan from bank earnings. J. MAKIN, supra note 5, at 237. The equity investments
are nonperforming since dividends and profits from resale come under regulations that
prohibit remittance and repatriation for specified time periods. This can present diffi-
culties in the short run, depending on the accounting and tax consequences.
The accounting method to be applied to the investments is controversial. Cur-
rently, they are accounted for under the equity method. See generally 2 APB Ac-
COUNTING PRINCIPLES, APB Op. No. 18 (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants
1973). [hereinafter APB Op. No. 18]. This method would allow a bank holding com-
pany to carry the investment on its books at a greater value than the debt would bring
if sold in the secondary market. Additionally, the method allows banks to account for
the value of dividends as they accrue despite the repatriation restrictions. Staff Memo-
randum, supra, at 6.
81 See J. Makin, supra note 5, at 253; French, supra note 42, at 120.
82 Layman & Kearney, supra note 20, at 45 n.10.
83 See Debs, supra note 67, at 20 (discussing the intricacy of swap deals); Mc-
Dougall, supra note 16, at 121 (discussing the steps in debt conversion).
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may be small."4 Nevertheless, debt/equity conversions do offer a valua-
ble means to reduce LDC debt, increase development and privatization,
and add flexibility to bank portfolios and the rescheduling process.8 5
4. THE NEED FOR REGULATION
Banks occupy a unique position in the economy. 8 As in-
termediaries between savers and investors, producers and consumers,"
banks regulate the economy. The Federal Reserve Board effectuates its
monetary policy through banks, 8 whose lending determines the money
supply.89 The safety and soundness of the banks is thus of utmost con-
cern to the Federal Reserve.90 The need for public confidence in the
banking system's liquidity and solvency has led to numerous regula-
tions. These regulations, while limiting banking options, shield banks
from the marketplace, protecting them from contingencies that could
lead to bank failure.91
The notion that banks' activities should be distinct from commerce
84 The external debt swapped in the five countries with the most active debt/
equity programs (Chile, Brazil, Mexico, the Philippines, and Argentina) totaled $4.1
billion at the end of 1986. This represented less than 2% of those countries' outstanding
debts that year ($315.6 billion). But if each country were to convert 2% of its outstand-
ing commercial debt over the next 5 years, $5 billion on interest service would be saved.
Layman & Kearney, supra note 20, at 34, 35. See Bruce, supra note 51, at 117 (detail-
ing volume of debt conversion in countries where swap programs have been
implemented).
85 See supra notes 50-68 and accompanying text.
88 Lissakers, Bank Regulation and International Debt, in UNCERTAIN FUTURE:
COMMERCIAL BANKS AND THE THIRD WORLD 45 (R. Feinberg & V. Kalleb eds.
1984). See generally Feinberg, supra note 12, at 5 (discussing the role of banking in
the U.S. economy).
87 Lissakers, supra note 86, at 45.
88 The Federal Reserve Board has three overlapping roles: it manipulates the
money supply and the course of the domestic economy; it serves as the unofficial super-
visor and lender of last resort for the vast network of global finance; and it regulates the
banks and monitors the financial system. W. GREIDER, supra note 5, at 504. The
current international debt crisis has raised serious questions about the adequacy of
bank supervision and regulation. See id. The provisions in the Amendment to Regula-
tion K, while modifying banks' permissible investments and activities abroad, reflect
long-standing notions of the need to insulate banks from the marketplace. See infra
note 90.
89 See Lissakers, supra note 86, at 45 (generalized description of relationship be-
tween banks and government policies).
80 W. GREIDER, supra note 5, at 504. At a hearing on bank deregulation, Federal
Reserve Board Chairman Paul Volcker observed that "in normal circumstances and in
most industries" the free market will restructure failing industries, "but when the
safety and soundness, broad confidence in banking institutions and continuity in the
provision of money and payments services are at stake, competition alone cannot be
relied upon to achieve the goals." Lissakers, supra note 86, at 46 (citing Volcker De-
fends Bank Interests, Wash. Post, Apr. 5, 1984, at Bi, col. 3).
"' See sources cited supra note 90.
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led to the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933.92 This Act was designed to re-
store public confidence in the banking system after the stock market
crash of 1929 and the ensuing depression. It separated investment
banking operations from commercial banking. Other regulations that
limit the scope and type of bank activities reflect the concern that close
ties between banks and nonfinancial companies might jeopardize the
safety and soundness of banks.9" Regulators have been concerned that
banks could be tempted to extend credit to affiliates94 on below-market
terms, even if the affiliates were not creditworthy. 5 Regulators also
fear that banks might stand behind the losses of their affiliates and
subject the banks to substantial losses.96 They are also concerned that a
bank might favor its affiliate over other debtors, adversely affecting fair
competition .
7
4.1. Changing Attitudes
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the Federal Reserve and other
regulators imposed few restraints on banks to curb their international
lending.98 Despite extensive lending to third world countries, banks felt
little pressure from regulators to curb their practices.99 Banks' activities
abroad were considered irrelevant to domestic concerns.'
00
In 1979, then Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker began an
aggressive effort to curb inflation through a tightening of the money
supply."'0 The dramatic rise in interest rates and the accompanying
recession made the burden of debt owed by non-oil developing countries
staggering.0 2 In the aftermath of the debt crisis, the permissive attitude
toward banks' activities abroad changed.'0 3
92 12 U.S.C. §§377-78 (1982); see also W. GREIDER, supra note 5, at 311.
11 See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. §§1842, 1843 (1982); Regulation Y, 12 C.F.R. pt. 225
(1988); 12 C.F.R. §211.4 (1988) (regulating Edge and agreement corporations).
" Rule 144(a)(1) of the Securities Act of 1933 defines "affiliate" as the following:
"An 'affiliate' of an issuer is a person that directly, or indirectly through one or more
intermediaries, controls, or is controlled by, or is under common control with, such
issuer." 17 C.F.R. §230.144 (1988).
95 P. HELLER, FEDERAL BANK HOLDING COMPANY LAW, §4.01 (1987).
98 Id.
97 Id.
98 W. GREIDER, supra note 5, at 519.
See generally Lissakers, supra note 86, at 46, 48-49.
100 These domestic concerns include the management of savings and credit, mone-
tary policy, and the protection of domestic depositors, borrowers, and investors. Id. at
48.
101 W. GREIDER, supra note 5, at 519.
102 Id. at 519, 547; see also Lissakers, supra note 86, at 49, 56; Feinberg, supra
note 12, at 5.
"I See Statement of General Policy at 12 C.F.R. §211.5:
(a) General Policy. Activities abroad, whether conducted directly or indi-
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Initially, the financial community considered the debt crisis a
"temporary" condition.'" The Federal Reserve Board encouraged
banks to continue short-term lending, bridge loans, to give debtor coun-
tries time to work out the financial crisis through economic growth."0 5
Despite Congressional hostility toward banks, the Fed resisted propos-
als for bank concessions on interest rates or debt forgiveness, while aus-
terity programs in debtor countries were implemented." 6 In 1985, then
Treasury Secretary James Baker proposed an optimistic plan which
focused on the growth of debtor economies as an alternative to austerity
programs for debt reduction.
10 7
Today, however, repeated debt reschedulings0 8 and a growing
rectly, shall be confined to those of a banking or financial nature and those
that are necessary to carry on such activities. In doing so, investors shall at
all times act in accordance with high standards of banking or financial
prudence, having due regard for diversification of risks, suitable liquidity,
and adequacy of capital. Subject to these considerations and the other pro-
visions of this section, it is the Board's policy to allow activities abroad to
be organized and operated as best meets corporate policies.
12 C.F.R. §211.5(a) (1988).
'o Working Seminar, supra note 31, at 1; Layman & Kearney, supra note 20, at
37.
105 Fishlow, Coming to Terms With the Latin Debt, N.Y. Times, Jan. 4, 1988, at
A19, col. 1. Alpern & Emerson, supra note 6, at A27, col. 2. See infra notes 108-16
and accompanying text. Critics warned that the commercial banking structure cannot
co-exist with substantial writedowns of LDC loans which are dangerously large in
relation to the banks' capital.
10" W. GREIDER, supra note 5, at 547. In a period of economic recovery and
gradual renewal of confidence in the banking system, Volcker was eager to protect the
greatly exposed earnings of the banks. Id. at 547, 549; see Truell & Murray, supra
note 1, at 1, col. 1. See also Silk, Brazil's Battle Against Banks, N.Y. Times, Mar. 4,
1987, at D2, col. 3 (noting the intransigent position taken by Citibank regarding con-
cessions to debtors); Beim, Must We Torpedo Our Banks?, N.Y. Times, May 4, 1987,
at A25, col. 1 (discussing the problems for banks posed by giving interest rate reduc-
tions or debt forgiveness to debtor countries). But cf. Broad, supra note 5, at A2 , col.
5 (suggesting need for "managed write-down of third world debt"). Another reason to
avoid capitalization of interest or debt forgiveness is the integrity of the international
banking system. Such concessions create a precedent that lessens the incentive for future
borrowers to meet the original obligations of a loan agreement. Layman & Kearney,
supra note 20, at 38.
107 Ipsen, Can the Baker Plan Work?, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Dec. 1985, at
279; Broad, supra note 5, at col. 4; Debs, supra note 67, at 12; Meltzer, supra note 9,
at 7, 8; Horowitz, Bankers Apprehensive on Further Loans to LDCs, J. Com., May 2,
1986, at 2A:
The debtor nations that would receive new funding are obliged to pursue
policies promoting economic growth through market liberalization mea-
sures. The plan's focus on economic growth policies seems to be a shift
from the International Monetary Fund's emphasis on austerity and re-
straint in the debtor economies.
But see Farnsworth, supra note 17, at 4, col. 1 (discussing the eventual frustration of
the Baker Plan).
108 See generally Comment, supra note 35, at 96-99; Lissakers, supra note 86, at
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consensus that the debt crisis is not a short-term lack of liquidity but a
long-term issue of solvency has led to "debt fatigue."' 0 9 Discussions of
LDC debt have shifted. The debt is no longer perceived as collectable.
Its value lies instead in its attractiveness on the small but growing sec-
ondary market." Several banks have recently added to their loan-loss
reserves to cover their LDC debt."' This suggests a recognition that
the loans may never be repaid and may eventually have to be written
off." 2 It also indicates a willingness on the part of banks to take control
at the bargaining table, even to reduce new lending" 3 in the face of
56-57.
109 Layman & Kearney, supra note 20, at 37, 38. Farnsworth, supra note 17, at
Dl, col. 6.
"I D. Gates, Redefining Asset Quality, THE BANKERS, Jan./Feb. 1988, at 5-6
(noting that value depends on marketability); see Farnsworth, New Debt Relief Policy,
N.Y. Times, Dec. 31, 1987, at 1 (noting that the Treasury's role in the Mexican debt-
bond swap plan acknowledges that part of third-world loans will not be paid). Trea-
sury participation in the Mexican conversion plan represents a major turn in strategy
from the Baker Plan, which maintained that the debt was repayable in full. See sources
cited supra note 107. It is also a concession that the Baker Plan did not succeed. See
Farnsworth, supra note 17, at 4, col. 1. For the first time, the United States is partici-
pating in debt restructuring at below the par value of the debt. Farnsworth, supra, at
1. See also Rohter, Latin America Hails Proposal on Mexican Debt, N.Y. Times, Dec.
31, 1987, at 23, col. 2 (noting Treasury's implicit acknowledgment that Latin Ameri-
can debts are unlikely to be repaid at full value).
"I W. GREIDER, supra note 5, at 712; Swardson, Citicorp Move Brings New
Era: Huge Reserve Raises Stakes in Debt Talks, Wash. Post, May 21, 1987, at F1, col.
2; Benton, supra note 10, at 6, col. 2. Banks are currently allowed to include loan-loss
reserves in their primary capital, which regulators require them to maintain at a cer-
tain minimum ratio to assets. Id. However, the International Lending Supervision Act
of 1983 requires banks to establish special reserves for troubled foreign loans. 12
U.S.C.A. §3904 (West Supp. 1988). The banks may not consider these reserves capital,
nor pool them with other loan reserves, as the banks ordinarily would. Lissakers, supra
note 86, at 59. See Fishlow, supra note 105, at A19, col. 1 (stating that the significant
decrease in market value of the old debt, along with the corresponding decline in bank
credit ratings, prompted the banks to add so extensively to their loan loss reserves).
Bank write-offs would also mean a loss to taxpayers, as banks would receive large tax
deductions for their loan losses. Id. at A19, col. 2. But see Rockefeller, Let's Not Write
Off Latin America, N.Y. Times, July 5, 1987, at E15, col. 1. The author states that
the reserve increases are mere transfers of funds that do not cost the banks anything
and do not diminish their incentive to recover their loans. Id. at E15, col. 2. Such
transfers have not only made "no real immediate impact on the overall debt situation,"
but they were actually followed by a significant rise in bank stock prices. Id. Banks
would be unwise to cut back on credit extensions to Latin America; because the banks
will probably have to refinance about one-third of the interest to ensure their receipt of
the other two-thirds, helping Latin America to maintain economic growth is very much
in the banks' own interest. Id. at El5, col. 6.
112 W. GREIDER, supra note 5, at 712.
113 See Brainard, supra note 33, at 43 (noting more cautious and conservative
lending policies by commercial banks). Banks' greater focus on domestic activities and
expansion into new product areas reflect a shift of priorities away from sovereign lend-
ing. Id. at 42-43.
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debtor demands for future concessions."" Meanwhile, many smaller,
regional banks, with less exposure, are prepared to write off their losses
and stop lending," 5 to avoid "throwing good money after bad.""'
The Amendments to Regulation K reflect these changes in several
ways. First, they recognize that the debt of many heavily indebted de-
veloping countries is "impaired.""'  This acknowledges the consensus
in the financial community that debtor countries are unable to earn
sufficient foreign exchange to service the debt. Second, they admit that
bank lending to debtor countries has decreased. Third, they recognize
that the solvency of the money-center banks is intimately connected
with rescheduling. Finally, they reflect a judgment that debt/equity
swaps may offer a new option for managing the debt problem.
14 See W. GREIDER, supra note 5, at 712. "Citibank, followed by the others, was
prepared to play a new kind of 'hardball' at the bargaining table, and that meant the
long-running debt crisis was about to enter a turbulent, new phase." Id. See also gen-
erally Swardson, supra note 111 (Citicorp's massive additions to loan-loss reserves per-
ceived by some as indicating tougher negotiating stance in response to debtors' pressure
for concessions or relief).
.. W. GREIDER, supra note 5, at 712. See also Truell & Murray, supra note 1,
at 4, col. 4 (noting that Bank of Boston had apparently begun a new round of reserving
in December, 1987); Buckler, NCNB Writes Off 56% of Mexico Loans, Wall St. J.,
Jan. 5, 1988, at 7, col. 2 (noting the strategy of NCBC Corp., a bank holding com-
pany, to "aggressively reduce its exposure" to loans to developing countries. NCNB
had sold its entire portfolio of Chilean loans in 1986 and all its Argentinean loans in
the third quarter of 1987). Regional banks, due to their larger reserves, are considered
more able to take big losses on their Mexican loans than the more heavily-exposed
money-center banks. Id. See French, supra note 42, at 118 (discussing possible cinse-
quences of the regional banks' hesitancy to continue lending).
116 See W. GREIDER, supra note 5, at 549; Bailey, First Bank System Places
Nearly All Its Latin Debt on Nonperforming Status, Wall St. J., Jan. 7, 1988, at 4,
col. 1; Rockefeller, supra note 111, at El5, col. 1 (noting that regional banks, which
are new to international lending, may now find the perfect excuse to cut off all new
credits to developing nations); see also Orr, supra note 60, at 84. This action by the
smaller banks would further depress the secondary market price of LDC debt. Ganit-
sky & Lema, Foreign Investment Through Debt-Equity Swaps, SLOAN MGMT. REV.,
Winter 1988, at 21, 24. This in turn would increase the burden shouldered by the
money-center banks. Consequently, both the Federal Reserve and the larger banks have
pressured the regional banks to adhere to the "We're all in this together" philosophy.
Newman, supra note 65, at 69.
.. The International Lending Supervision Act of 1983, 12 U.S.C. §§3901-3912
(Supp. IV 1987), mandates that special reserves be established by U.S. lenders when
the inability of debtors to repay is sufficiently clear. For the regulations by which the
Federal Reserve Board, the Comptroller of the Currency, and the Federal Deposit In-
surance Corporation determine which loans require such reserves, see International
Banking Operations, 12 C.F.R. §§211.41-.43 (1988).
19881
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Bus. L.
4.2. Amendments to Regulation K
4.2.1. The Regulatory Structure
The Federal Reserve Act ("FRA")," the Bank Holding Com-
pany Act ("BHCA")," 9 and Regulations K 20 and Y,12 ' promulgated
by the Federal Reserve Board, govern foreign investment activities of
U.S. banking organizations. Under Regulation Y, a member bank is
not permitted to directly acquire foreign equity investments.122 How-
ever, §25 of the Federal Reserve Act permits a member bank to invest
directly in Edge Act and Agreement Corporations. 23 United States
banks may thus acquire equity investments through a bank holding
company ("BHC") or an Edge Act Corporation, though they may not
hold foreign equity investments directly.1
24
Regulation K implements the foreign equity investment provisions
set forth in the Bank Holding Company Act, the Federal Reserve Act
and the International Banking Act of 1978.125 Under Regulation K,
prior to the Amendments, a U.S. banking organization could hold all of
the shares of a foreign financial company, but only up to 20% of the
shares of a foreign nonfinancial company.' 26 This reflected the Federal
Reserve Board's philosophy that foreign investments made pursuant to
the BHCA and Edge Act should be limited to those considered "usual
in connection with the transaction of banking or other financial opera-
tions abroad."' 27 The 20% cap on investments made in foreign nonfi-
nancial companies was imposed to ensure that banking organizations
maintained only a portfolio interest, and thus would not become in-
volved in management of the foreign company. Banking organizations
weqe permitted to acquire between 20% and 50% (a "controlling inter-
est'j) of the voting stock of a foreign company if at least 90% of the
company's assets or revenues related to financial activities. 2 s
118 12 U.S.C. §226 (1988).
... 12 U.S.C., ch. 17, §§1841-1850 (1988).
120 12 C.F.R. §211 (1988).
121 12 C.F.R. §225 (1988).
122 12 C.F.R. §§225.21-.22.
12 12 U.S.C. §§611-631 (1988). Corporations authorized under the Edge Act are
bank subsidiaries which are engaged solely in international banking or act as invest-
ment holding companies. Agreement Corporations are similar.
12, BHCA §4(c)(3); FRA §25(a).
"- 12 U.S.C. §3101 (1988).
126 See 12 C.F.R. §§211.2(k),(n),(p); 211.5(b)(1)(i)(A), (b)(1)(c), (d) (1988).
127 12 C.F.R. §211.5(d) (1988).
128 12 C.F.R. §211.5(b)(1)(i) (1988).
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4.2.2. The Amendments to Regulation K
On August 19, 1987, the Federal Reserve Board amended Regula-
tion K' 29 in recognition of the economic value of debt/equity conver-
sions and of the banks' desire to make controlling investments in for-
eign companies not engaged in financial activities. The August
Amendment was structured to parallel in the foreign context the troub-
led debt restructurings available in the domestic arena under Regula-
tion Y. Regulation Y permits banks to acquire a short-term equity in-
terest in a company to avoid a loss on debt previously contracted
("dpc") with that company.' This provision was designed as a tempo-
rary measure, to be invoked only when necessary to prevent loss of a
debt previously incurred. 3'
The August Amendment permitted banking organizations to own
all the stock of nonfinancial companies acquired from the governments
of heavily indebted countries but only up to 20% of the shares of nonfi-
nancial private sector companies. Yet the incongruence of the LDC
debt situation and the circumstances surrounding the use of the dpc
provision domestically limited the impact of the Amendment. The
Amendment was extensively criticized by the U.S. banks as misdirected
and practically useless.
Subsequently, on February 24, 1988,1"2 the Federal Reserve
Board again amended Regulation K to further accommodate the needs
of the banks. The new Amendment made four significant changes. It
broadened the permissible equity investments to encompass holdings of
up to 40% in any foreign private sector nonfinancial company.' 33 It
permitted banking organizations to extend loans, in addition to equity,
to a foreign company.134 It lengthened the holding period in which
banking organizations are allowed to retain investments made pursuant
to debt/equity swaps.'1 5 It liberalized the general consent and notice
procedures.' 6
The February Amendment more effectively addressed the ability
of banks to participate in debt/equity swaps by tailoring the dpc con-
cept to the foreign debt context. Many criticisms, however, still remain.
Banks are now permitted to own up to 25% of the voting stock of a
129 See supra note 7.
SO 12 C.F.R. §225.12(b) (1988).
131 12 C.F.R. §211.5(0 (1988).
132 See supra note 8.
13 53 Fed. Reg. 5,360 (1988) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 211.5(f)(2)(ii)).
53 Fed. Reg. 5,360 (1988) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. §211.5(0(2)(ii)(B)).
'8 53 Fed. Reg. 5,361 (1988) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. §211.5(0(4)).
138 53 Fed. Reg. 5,362 (1988) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. §211.5(0(5)).
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foreign nonfinancial company and up to 40% if an unaffiliated share-
holder holds a larger block. As with the August Amendment, the ques-
tion remains whether the increase in the permissible investment level in
a nonfinancial private sector company is significant when coupled with
other restrictions concerning how the remainder of the shares must be
held, divestiture requirements, debt financing limitations, the type of
debt that can be swapped, and the form through which the equity in-
vestment must be held.
5. ANALYSIS
The August Amendment to Regulation K received extensive criti-
cism from the banking industry. 137 The criticism was targeted at four
areas. First, banks were interested in making equity investments in
more than 20% of the shares of nonfinancial private sector companies.
Second, banks foresaw difficulties in the time limit specified for divesti-
ture. Third, banks wanted the provision regulating investment proce-
dures to be liberalized. Fourth, banks wished to hold the investments
made pursuant to debt/equity conversions through the bank as well as
through the bank holding company.1 38 Each of these criticisms was ad-
dressed by the February Amendment.
5.1. Private v. Public Sector Investments
The August Amendment restricted equity investments to nonfinan-
cial companies being privatized. 3 9 The February Amendment permits
a bank holding company to acquire up to 40% of a foreign private
sector company subject to certain conditions. These conditions allow a
bank holding company to acquire more than 25% of the voting shares
of a private sector company only if another shareholder or group of
1I" See generally Citicorp Letter, supra note 53; Mellon Bank Letter, supra note
63; letter from R. Simmons, Chemical Bank of New York, to William W. Wiles, Sec-
retary, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Sept. 29, 1987) [hereinafter
Chemical Bank Letter]; letter from J. Simone, Executive Vice President, Manufactur-
ers Hanover, to William W. Wiles, Secretary, Board of Governors of the Federal Re-
serve System (Sept. 25, 1987) [hereinafter Manufacturers Hanover Letter].
138 Staff Memorandum, supra note 80, at 1-2.
139 12 C.F.R. §211.5(f)(2)(ii) (1988). The process of privatization occurs when
state-owned companies are denationalized and sold to the private sector. See Savas,
Private Enterprise is Profitable Enterprise, N.Y. Times, Feb. 14, 1988, at F2, col. 3
(discussing the advantages of privatization); but cf. Wortzel, 'Privatizing' Does Not
Always Work, N.Y. Times, Feb. 14, 1988, at F2, col. 3 (discussing the disadvantages of
privatization). Since public companies are often undercapitalized, their transfer to pri-
vate ownership will mean a need to increase capital. See Bentley, supra note 45, at 40
(stating that without sovereign debt conversion programs, there will not be enough cap-
ital for a serious privatization effort).
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shareholders unaffiliated with the bank holding company holds a larger
block of voting shares.14 Additionally, the bank holding company
would not be able to extend credit of more than 50% of its total loans
outstanding to the foreign company.'" Finally, the bank holding com-
pany could be represented on the board of directors of the foreign com-
pany only in proportion to its shareholding."4 2
In response to the August Amendment, the banking industry ad-
vanced several arguments for bank investment in private sector rather
than privatized companies. The industry maintained that the supply of
privatized companies included in debt/equity programs was limited. 43
The banks also claimed that a private sector company was more likely
to be well-managed and efficiently operated than a public sector com-
pany.'44 They contended that the private sector companies are sounder
investments, thus investment in them should be encouraged to foster
bank stability and to shield the financial system from further losses.
1 5
The banks argued, finally, that since foreign banking organizations are
not prevented from exchanging their eligible debt for privately held
companies,' 46 any restriction placed on U.S. banks' private sector in-
vestment places them at a competitive disadvantage in attempting to
minimize their foreign debt exposure.
These arguments presented significant concerns. There are inher-
ent limits to U.S. bank investment in foreign privatized companies.
Debtor governments, fearful of the political and economic consequences
of foreign investment in their most productive and indigenous enter-
140 Federal Reserve Act, 12 U.S.C. 226 (1988).
141 Bank Holding Company Act, 12 U.S.C. §1843 (1988).
142 53 Fed. Reg. 5,362 (1988) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. §211.5(f)(2)(ii)(C)).
143 Programs in both Argentina and Venezuela explicitly restrict foreigners
from using swaps to invest in state enterprises, even if the enterprise is to
be privatized. In Costa Rico, foreigners are limited to at most a 40 percent
share of such enterprises. The only countries where ... foreigners have
used swaps for investment in privatized companies are Argentina, Chile,
Mexico, and the Philippines.
Chemical Bank Letter, supra note 136, at 2; see also Clearing House Letter, supra
note 40, at 3; Citicorp Letter, supra note 53, at 7.
144 Privatized companies are seen as substandard investments due to their finan-
cial difficulties; major labor problems; lack of competitiveness; cost inefficiencies; level
of indebtedness; high purchase price; and the onerous conditions that could be imposed
on the purchaser. Clearing House Letter, supra note 40, at 3; Savas, supra note 138,
at F2, col. 3; Wortzel, supra note 138, at F2, col. 3; see Citicorp Letter, supra note 53,
at 7 (noting the inferior earnings prospects of companies being privatized).
14 Clearing House Letter, supra note 40, at 7.
146 American Express proposes to swap $10 million in LDC debt to construct
hotels. A Brazilian investment house has purchased 100% of Atlantic Richfield's gas
pumping operations in Brazil and is now syndicating the investment. Chemical Bank
Letter, supra note 136, at 4; Clearing House Letter, supra note 40, at 3; Manufactur-
ers Hanover Letter, supra note 136, at 4.
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prises, 1 7 have limited the number of privatized companies available for
foreign investment."4 8 Although many nationalized companies are in
the process of privatization, profound "sovereignty concerns"" 9 make
these countries wary of "colonialism" and risks of expropriation.' 5
The argument that private sector companies are usually better
managed, more efficient, and thus better investments is also legiti-
mate.1 5' The state enterprises that are put up for sale are usually those
performing poorly. 52 Even when the debtor countries offer financial
incentives, such as converting the debt for equity in privatized compa-
nies at a more favorable exchange rate, few transactions actually
occur.
153
The objective of banks, as with all investors, is to invest in those
14,7 For instance, Mexico has indicated that certain industries will be reserved for
the government. These include the petroleum industry, the nuclear power and radioac-
tive minerals industry, mining, electricity, the railroads, and the telegraph and radio
telecommunications industry. Other activities are exclusively reserved for Mexicans: ra-
dio and television; urban and federal highways motor transportation; air and sea do-
mestic transportation; forestry extraction; and gas distribution. Operating Manual,
supra note 41, at V-6. The Operating Manual establishes the official procedures for
use by the Mexican government in approving debt/equity conversions. See Truell &
Yang, Fed Agrees to Let U.S. Banks Acquire Nonfinancial Firms in Debtor Nations,
Wall St. J., Aug. 13, 1987, at 3, col. 4. See also Debt-Equity Conversions, supra note
67, at app. C (charting the 1987 stance on foreign investment for Argentina, Brazil,
Chile, Mexico, the Philippines, Columbia, Ecuador, Nigeria, and Venezuela).
148 Since Chile's debt/equity swap program began in 1985, only 10% of the assets
swapped in Chile have involved privatizations. Clearing House Letter, supra note 40,
at 2; see Citicorp Letter, supra note 53, at 7. Note that most of the swaps that have
occurred to date have arisen from the investments of multinational companies in private
companies. But see Wortzel, supra note 138, at F2, col. 2 (stating that often the size of
the privatized enterprise in relation to the capital available from potential purchasers
may make the purchase difficult for most investors).
149 See supra note 75.
160 See Mellon Bank Senate Letter, supra note 9, at 10. This is evident in the
divestiture, remittance, and repatriation restrictions.
161 See Mellon Bank Letter, supra note 63, at 3. Privatized companies are often
over-staffed, lack a meaningful earnings history, and have often been managed on a
not-for-profit basis, to achieve social purposes. These investments might also obligate
banks to get involved in the debtor country's political process, particularly if staff re-
ductions or other cutbacks are involved.
16. Wortzel, supra note 138, at F2, col. 3. Many political and ideological concerns
hinder privatization. Labor unions and ministries may be unwilling to give up control
of the enterprise. Indigenous companies are often seen as national symbols. Addition-
ally, if the enterprise is doing well and earning a profit, the debtor government will
want to keep it. Since privatizing every state firm is unrealistic, those that are available
are often the least desirable.
... For instance, in Mexico, despite the favorable redemption rate, no transactions
involving privatized companies have been reported. This is noteworthy because over
$2.5 billion worth of swap activity has occurred. Similarly, in Chile, where swap activ-
ity has totaled approximately $580 million, and in the Philippines, where the conver-
sions have totaled more than $100 million, only a few transactions have involved priva-
tized companies. Chemical Bank Letter, supra note 136, at 3, 4.
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companies that promise the greatest return, free from government-im-
posed restrictions."" To the extent that a bank believes that it shquld
undertake debt/equity conversions, it has decided that its long-term
strategy is best served by investing rather than liquidating its deht in
the secondary market. The quality of the investment thus becomes a
material factor in the bank's decision.
In addition, the analog to the dpc provision in the Bank Holding
Company Act'55 may be overly restrictive in the debt/equity context. In
a dpc restructuring, a creditor is allowed to foreclose on a bad loan and
to acquire the pledged collateral as a means of offsetting the loan obli-
gation.1 56 In a debt/equity restructuring, a bank's sovereign lending is
secured by a government's guaranty157 rather than private collateral.
This raises the issue of whether unrelated third party property can be
accepted in exchange for the debt. A recent no-objection letter issued by
the Comptroller of the Currency authorized the International Bank of
Miami, under dpc authority, to convert $2 million of its Mexican pub-
lic debt for an interest in a privately owned Mexican hotel, pursuant to
the Mexican government's debt/equity conversion program.'55 This let-
ter broadly interprets the dpc guidelines to permit conversion of public
sector debt into private equity. In some ways it serves as a precursor for
bank ownership of shares in nonfinancial private sector companies.
The contention that nonbanks and foreign banks are able to invest
in private sector companies suggests that U.S. banks may be at an un-
warranted competitive disadvantage. However, banks can avail them-
selves of the secondary market, both as a means to liquidate their debt
and to realize some of the benefit of the discount through brokerage
fees. Banks may thus be able to remain competitive without swapping
debt for their own accounts. Allowing banks who possess the debt to
swap debt for equity in private nonfinancial enterprises might even give
banks an unfair advantage over nonbanks and private investors.' 5  The
provision may limit the scope of bank activities abroad precisely be-
cause of the threat posed to the banking system when banks engage in
nonfinancial activities.
The February Amendment recognizes that encouraging banks to
'" Mellon Bank Letter, supra note 63, at 4.
151 See id.
151 Often the collateral that is pledged is ownership in a business enterprise owned
by the debtor. Layman & Kearney, supra note 20, at 43.
157 Id.
158 No-Objection Letter from Comptroller of the Currency to the International
Bank of Miami, 5 (Nov. 27, 1987).
15 See Debs, supra note 67 (stating that international debt policy should decrease
the role of commercial lenders by encouraging private investment).
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engage in debt/equity conversions means allowing them to make equity
invostments in attractive companies. Otherwise, banks will not find it
economically advantageous to undertake conversions. The provision in
the Yebruary Amendment allowing bank holding companies to main-
tain an interest of up to 40% in private nonfinancial companies appears
to be an economically advantageous and prudent measure. Despite the
conditions, banking organizations can make substantial investments in
private nonfinancial companies and take advantage of the tax conse-
quences of an operational investment.'
Although banking organizations inevitably wish to exert as much
control as possible over companies where they maintain investments,
the Federal Reserve Board must act cautiously. The February Amend-
ment refuses to allow banks to gain "working control" or a greater
than 25% interest unless an unaffiliated entity has as great an interest.
Conflict-of-interest situations that might further jeopardize the finan-
cial position of banks are avoided. The February Amendment thus
adapts the structure of the dpc provision in the foreign context while
maintaining the fundamental concept that investment is a bail-out mea-
sure rather than a new source of investment activity.
5.2. Divestiture Requirements
The divestiture restrictions imposed by the recent Amendments' 6 '
also arise from the dpc analog to foreign investments."6 2 The restric-
tions underscore the investments as a means of portfolio restructuring
rather than a long-term profit opportunity.
The Federal Reserve Board initially proceeded cautiously, requir-
ing divestiture after five years, with extensions allowed on a case-by-
case basis for up to five more years. The banking industry was con-
cerned about these short time limits. Most debtor countries structured
their conversion agreements to prohibit repatriation of the investment
principal for a period of ten to twelve years.' 3 If banks were required
to divest after five years, they might be forced to make sales on unfa-
160 See supra note 54.
161 12 C.F.R. §211.5(f)(1)(iv) (1988): "[T]he shares are divested within five years
of acquisition unless the Board extends such time period for good cause shown but no
such extension may in the aggregate exceed five years."
162 See supra note 54.
163 Chemical Bank Letter, supra note 136, at 6, 7. Foreign divestiture require-
ments are as follows: Argentina-10 years; Brazil-12 years; Chile-10 years; Mexico-12
years; Venezuela-no repatriation for 5 years, then up to 12% for the next 8 years, and
no limit after 13 years. These restrictions are designed to reflect the debt restructuring
agreements and the political and economic policies behind them. But see Staff Memo-
randum, supra note 80, app. A; according to the information provided to the Board,
only Mexico prohibited repatriation for a period longer than 10 years.
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vorable terms.164 There might be few potential purchasers of invest-
ments during the period when repatriation is not permitted by local
rules, due to the difficulties of transferability. 6 5
The agreements formulated by most countries prohibited domestic
buyers from purchasing investments resulting from these swaps.' 66
Many swap programs have technical specifications that forbid sales to
nationals altogether and restrict foreign sales to those foreigners who
are parties to the country's restructuring agreements.16 7 Local provi-
sions that third parties must consent to the original terms of the swap
agreement further limit the feasibility of the sale.' 68 Dividend and
profit remittance restrictions also complicate sale possibilities. 6 The
depressed condition of the debtor economies and the riskiness of the
investment also limit the attractiveness of the investment and its resale
potential.' 70 With few available purchasers, a bank would be forced to
accept the prices offered for its equity.
The February Amendment, therefore, extended the time limit to
the lesser of fifteen years or two years beyond the end of the period
established by the country restricting repatriation of the investment.'
The February Amendment also requires a bank holding company to
report its divestiture plan to the Board no later than ten years after the
investment is made and again two years before the final date for divest-
iture. 7 2 Additionally, if the bank holding company engages in imper-
missible business in the United States, then the Board has the authority
to require earlier divestiture. 7
The February Amendment appropriately recognizes that the
short-term nature of the dpc provision must be reconciled with the
long-term goals of debt/equity conversions. To the extent that the
Board believes that a divestiture period more in line with the debtor
programs will not jeopardize the banking system, it has accommodated
both the banks and the debtors.
Clearing House Letter, supra note 40, at 4.
165 Chemical Bank Letter, supra note 136, at 7, 8.
166 Id.
167 Id.
168 Id.
169 Id.
170 Id.
171 Amendment to Regulation K, 53 Fed. Reg. 5,361 (1988); see also Clearing
House Letter, supra note 40, at 4 (discussing the uncertainty created by the need to
seek periodic Board approval to extend the holding period as a "material detract[ion]
from the viability of the Swap Investments").
12 Amendment to Regulation K, 53 Fed. Reg. 5,362 (1988) (to be codified at 12
C.F.R. §211.5(f)(4)(i) and (ii)).
13 Amendment to Regulation K, 53 Fed. Reg. 5,362 (1988) (to be codified at 12
C.F.R. §211.5(f)(4)(iii)).
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5.3. Portfolio Investments
'Few banks have expressed a desire to acquire 100% ownership in
a nonfinancial company.'1 4 While banks may desire to exert influence
over the companies in which they invest,7 5 they are not interested in
"permanent investments in nonbank concerns."' 6 In seeking a liberali-
zation of the investment restriction, banks want to take advantage of the
accounting and tax consequences that arise when banks hold equity in-
terests of greater than 20%."' Under generally accepted principles of
accounting, the equity method of accounting must be employed by in-
vestors who own 20% or more of a company or exert other significant
influence over that company.' 7 8 Under Regulation K, equity invest-
ments in private companies below 20% are termed "portfolio invest-
ments."' The disadvantage associated with portfolio investments is
that investors must account for them by the cost method. 8 This pre-
cludes them from including earnings gained from investments in income
as they accrue.' 8 ' Thus, the banks' objective in seeking to liberalize the
investment limit stems less from a desire to gain control of a nonfinan-
cial company than from a desire to take advantage of equity accounting
rules. This is particularly true because the banks are swapping a per-
"" Cf McDougall, supra note 16, at 121 ("Those who have lent to Latin
America do not want to own great chunks of it any more than Latin America wants all
its assets in foreign hands."); Staff Memorandum, supra note 80, at 4 ("[Mjost of our
members have not expressed an interest in making controlling investments in private
companies in debt/equity swaps.").
178 McDougall, supra note 16, at 121; Staff Memorandum, supra note 80, at 4.
176 Our interest ... is not in acquiring permanent control of such compa-
nies but rather [in] being able to make a meaningful investment in a com-
pany that will ultimately enable us to treat the investment on an equity
accounting basis, while allowing us to divest of the interest in an economi-
cally sound fashion.
Mellon Bank Letter, supra note 63, at 5. See also Staff Memorandum, supra note 80,
at 4.
177 Banks are currently allowed to make portfolio investments in nonfinancial
companies abroad. 12 C.F.R. §211.5(b)(1)(i)(C) (1988).
178 The equity method can be employed by investors retaining less than 20% in-
terest in certain circumstances where significant influence from an accounting stand-
point can be shown. APB Op. No. 18, supra note 80, para. 17. For instance, represen-
tation on the board of directors, substantial policy making responsibility, interchange of
managerial personnel, or material intercompany transactions have been considered indi-
cia of control by the Board. Id. Without 20% equity interest, it is unlikely that the
banks could demonstrate significant control.
17M 12 C.F.R. §211.2(n) defines portfolio investment as an investment in an organ-
ization that is not a subsidiary (more than 50% investment or control, 12 C.F.R.
§211.2(h)), and not a joint venture (more than 20% investment or control but less than
50%) 12 C.F.R. §211.2(k) (1988).
180 Mellon Bank Letter, supra note 63, at 5; see APB Op. No. 18, supra note 80,
para. 17.
181 Treas. Reg. §1.446-1(4)(c)(i).
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forming loan for a nonperforming asset.
The $15 million general consent limit and the forty-five-day prior
notice requirement allow the Board to regulate individual banks' activ-
ity.'" 2 Under the August Amendment, any investment of less than $15
million and less than five percent of the investor's capital may be made
without prior notice to the Board. 8' Under the February Amendment,
general consent exists if the total amount invested does not exceed the
greater of $15 million or one percent of the equity of the investor." 4
All other investments would require prior notice or specific consent of
the Board. 8" Although most swap transactions to date have been below
$15 million, a few have exceeded $100 million.'86 Banks claim that the
flat dollar limit restricts their flexibility to make quick decisions about
large investments." 7 Banks also contend that this limit places them at a
competitive disadvantage with nonbanks and foreign banks.' 8
There is, however, much support for the Board's cautious ap-
proach to bank investment. These restrictions reflect the Board's desire
not to interfere with an expedited handling of investments, but to over-
see investments when they become substantial and potentially costly. 8 '
The general consent limit and notice provisions constitute important
safeguards. They encourage discipline and caution, particularly when
substantial amounts of capital are committed to nonfinancial endeavors.
The limit provision facilitates the Fed's role as supervisor of the banks.
Moreover, the ability of banks to make quick decisions regarding in-
vestments is already hampered by the approval delays in the debtor
country.' 0 The general consent limit thus imposes minimal hardship
on the banks.
5.4. Holding Investment Through the Bank Holding Company
The requirement that banks hold the equity investments resulting
from a debt/equity conversion in a bank holding company or a non-
182 Like the privatization requirement, these provisions were modeled on the
guidelines. Conversation with Ricki Tigert, Assistant General Counsel of the Federal
Reserve (Jan. 6, 1988).
183 12 C.F.R. §§211.5(c)(1)(i)(A), (B) (1988).
18, Amendment to Regulation K, 53 Fed. Reg. 5,362 (1988) (to be codified at 12
C.F.R. §211.5(0(5)(i)).
185 Amendment to Regulation K, 53 Fed. Reg. 5,362 (1988) (to be codified at 12
C.F.R. §211.5()(5)(ii)).
Ise McDougall, supra note 16, at 121-22.
187 See Clearing House Letter, supra note 40, at 6-7.
188 See Clearing House Letter, supra note 40, at 7; Mellon Bank Letter, supra
note 63, at 6.
8 9 Staff Memorandum, supra note 80, at 7.
190 Id.
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bank subsidiary reflects the traditional notion that banks function in a
sphere distinct from commerce. The February Amendment slightly re-
laxed this provision by permitting an investment to be made through an
insured bank subsidiary of the bank holding company.191 However, the
bank holding company must demonstrate that this form of ownership is
necessary due to special circumstances such as local law require-
ments.192 The Board also reserves the authority to impose additional
conditions, such as prohibiting loans from the bank to the foreign com-
pany.'93 The fear is that the affiliation of the bank with the nonfinan-
cial company will tempt the bank to extend loans at below market
rates.'94 Or, with a joint venture, the Board might prohibit a bank from
making more favorable loans either to the company or to the
partners.
95
The holding company provision 96 works in conjunction with other
conditions in the Amendment, such as the company name and the ex-
change of information conditions, to make the company and bank oper-
ations appear distinct. The company name condition 97 requires that
any company acquired pursuant to a debt/equity conversion must
maintain a name different from that of the bank. This condition stems
from a desire to prevent a misleading perception in the market. With
different names, the chance that the nonfinancial company and the
bank will be identified as one diminishes. This lessens the likelihood
that the bank will confront external pressure to support its nonfinancial
company in case of losses. The name separation also reinforces the no-
tion that the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC") back-
ing that protects banks in the domestic context will not be available to
the nonfinancial company.' 98
Another provision in the Amendments limits the exchange of con-
fidential information between the bank and the nonfinancial company.
Since the affiliate is engaged in nonfinancial activities, it may be in-
volved in areas similar to, and thus potentially competitive with, the
banks' customers or affiliates.' 99 This provision bars the use of confi-
dential information for improper purposes.2"'
191 Amendment to Regulation K, 53 Fed. Reg. 5,362 (1988) (to be codified at 12
C.F.R. §211.5(f)(3)).
192 Id.
193 Id.
194 P. HELLER, supra note 95, at §4.01, 4-4.
195 Amendment to Regulation K, 52 Fed. Reg. 30,913 (1987).
198 12 C.F.R. §§211.5()(3)(i), (ii) (1988).
197 12 C.F.R. §211.5(0(3)(i) (1988).
198 Amendment to Regulation K, 52 Fed. Reg. 30,913-14 (1987).
199 Clearing House Letter, supra note 40, at 8.
200 12 C.F.R. §211.5(f)(6)(ii) (1988).
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Banks object to the requirement that their equity investments ac-
quired through debt/equity swaps be held in bank holding companies
or nonbank affiliates. Their discontent concerns the tax and accounting
consequences of the provision.2° Banks fear that a transfer of debt to
the bank holding company will constitute a disposition of assets requir-
ing a valuation." °2 Banks, however, want to undertake the debt/equity
conversions precisely to avoid this mark-down of the debt. Additionally,
according to Federal Reserve Act §23A,203 the bank holding company
must be capitalized to purchase the debt. This makes financing more
costly for banks, who are then forced to raise capital in the market
rather than use funds from their own deposits.
Banks would like to see this transaction exempted from §23A if
they are forced to set up holding companies for these equity invest-
ments.204 This would permit banks to contribute debt outright to their
affiliates within the context of the swap program, without the collater-
201 Staff Memorandum, supra note 80, at 8; see Citicorp Letter, supra note 53, at
9; Clearing House Letter, supra note 40, at 5 ("[C]ertain debtor countries require that
an investor be a subsidiary of a banking institution. Thus, holding the Swap Invest-
ment outside the bank may not be feasible").
202 The transfer of the debt from the bank to the holding company raises two
issues. First, the transfer may be considered a tax-free capital contribution. Second, if
the transfer is not treated as tax-free, then it is necessary to determine whether the
transfer would result in a taxable gain to the U.S. bank.
The regulation under the current tax law relating to tax-free capital contributions
is unclear. If capital is contributed by a U.S. company to an 80% foreign corporation,
then it might qualify for tax-free treatment. However, this is not available for contribu-
tions characterized as "tainted" property. It is presently unclear whether LDC debt
will constitute "tainted" property in this context.
If the transfer is not treated as a tax-free capital contribution, then the U.S. com-
pany may realize a gain on the transfer of appreciated property under 26 U.S.C.A.
§61(a)(3) (West Supp. 1988). The gain would be measured by the difference between
the dollar value of the local currency to be received by the subsidiary on retirement of
the debt and the amount the U.S. bank originally paid for the debt. 26 U.S.C. §1001(a)
(1988).
There is a strong argument that the bank would not realize a gain on the transfer.
In a simultaneous transfer, the fair market value of the debt when transferred should
equal the amount paid for it by the U.S. bank. Additionally, the U.S. bank usually does
not have the right to receive the local currency from the foreign government, since this
is directed to the holding company. It could be argued that the transfer has no effect on
the fair market value of the debt held by the U.S. bank because the bank would be
unable to sell the debt to a third party for any more than its original cost. Thus, this
transfer might not result in any taxable gain being realized by the U.S. bank. Coopers
& Lybrand, supra note 40, at 6, 7.
203 12 U.S.C. 371(c) (1982). This provision restricts transactions between banks
and affiliates. It prevents banks from extending loans to their affiliates unless they are
collateralized. But see Clearing House Letter, supra note 40, at 6 (noting that the
Board could alternatively address its concern by placing §23A restrictions on loans to
enterprises controlled by banking organizations, without requiring that the investment
be held outside the bank).
2*4 Staff Memorandum, supra note 80, at 6.
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alization requirement. The issue will most likely be resolved by treating
the transaction as a simultaneous transfer, thereby eliminating any neg-
ative tax consequences.10 5 Thus, this restriction should have no detri-
mental economic effect on the banks. Since the provision establishes ac-
cepted and important safeguards, it should be maintained despite bank
arguments to the contrary.
6. PROPOSAL
6.1. Blue Skies Abroad: Freedom of Banking Beyond U.S. Borders
One alternative to the Amendments to Regulation K is further, or
total, deregulation. Without U.S.-imposed restrictions, banks would be
able to engage in debt/equity swaps within the framework of foreign
conversion programs. Total deregulation, however, would be inappro-
priate for several reasons.
First, although banks ought to be encouraged to make debt/equity
swaps for their own accounts,20 6 it would undermine basic principles of
safety and soundness to allow long-term equity investments in non fi-
nancial companies.107 The interests of banks and those of regulators
may diverge in several areas. The speculative nature of bank interests,
together with problems of potential conflicts of interest and preferential
treatment, suggest a need for safeguarding restrictions.
Where the safety of the U.S. financial system is at stake, to rely on
foreign regulations to supervise divestiture is risky and troublesome.
The security of banks would be subject to the political and economic
instabilities of developing countries.20 8 New governments and policies
205 See Coopers & Lybrand, supra note 40, at 7.
208 See supra notes 50-68 and accompanying text.
207 See supra notes 86-97 and accompanying text.
208 See supra note 81. Although the major banks have joined to form a creditors'
cartel for the purpose of debt restructurings, the debtors have never organized a joint
default. The crucial reason for this has been that the financial crises of the debtor
countries have never coincided. For instance, in 1984, when Argentina challenged its
creditors, both Brazil and Mexico believed that their crises were easing. They discour-
aged Argentina from defaulting. Similarly, in 1985, when Peru limited its debt pay-
ments to 10% of its export earnings, it received no support from other debtors. In 1986,
when Mexico came close to suspending its debt payments, Brazil and Argentina, sure
that their new stabilization programs would succeed, offered little support. Again, in
1987, when Brazil called its debt moratorium, Mexico and Argentina had just con-
cluded new agreements and were uninterested in concerted action.
Despite the inability of debtor nations to coalesce in the past, the possibility of a
joint moratorium still exists. Debtor countries increasingly regard the burden of servic-
ing their debts as the chief cause of their economic stagnation. Additionally, for the first
time since 1982, Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina are suffering the effects of high infla-
tion, minimal growth, rising unemployment, and weak governments. See Riding, supra
note 15, at D8, col. 6.
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could quickly repudiate safeguards that would no longer seem desirable
to them but which had been necessary to protect important U.S. con-
cerns.209 The use of debt/equity swaps to allow banks to gain control-
ling investments in nonfinancial companies would also allow them to
gain entrance into new markets to which they are denied access domes-
tically. This might set an unwarranted precedent for deregulation of
banks' domestic activities.
Second, total deregulation overlooks the realities of multiparty co-
operation. While one goal of deregulation may be to eventually return
to a two-party negotiating process,210 the current debt situation de-
mands the participation of international organizations and govern-
ments."' The unenthusiastic reception of the Mexican zero-coupon
bond proposal212 suggests the inability of banks and debtors, even with
government support, to find mutually advantageous terms.21 3
Debt/equity swaps were originally introduced as a means to en-
courage recapitalization and new investment in debtor countries while
reducing their outstanding debt.214 The mechanism was designed for
investors, not for banks. It was also created as a means to reduce reli-
ance on bank lending by fostering private investment.215 The latter
209 See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
210 See Meltzer, supra note 9, at 10.
211 See Feinberg, supra note 12, at 8 (noting that banks' future lending levels will
be influenced by many factors, including actions taken by governments and interna-
tional financial institutions).
212 Mexico and the Morgan Guaranty Trust Company developed a proposal in
which a portion of Mexican debt held by U.S. banks would be exchanged at a discount
for as much as $10 billion in new, marketable Mexican securities. These securities
would be backed by 20-year, zero-coupon U.S. Treasury bonds. See A New Handle on
Third World Debt, N.Y. Times, Jan. 11, 1988, at A18, col. 1; Truell & Murray,
supra note 1, at 1, col. 1; Hill, Truell & Bailey, Some Big Banks Plan to Shun Mexi-
can Plan, Wall St. J., Jan. 8, 1988, at 2, col. 3; Banks' Plans on Mexico, N.Y. Times,
Feb. 13, 1988, at 48, col. 5 (stating that leading U.S. banks are not expected to partici-
pate in Mexico's debt-reduction plan).
213 The debt/equity program offers both debtor and creditor distinct advantages.
It is an informal mechanism by which debtors and creditors can reduce debt and stimu-
late investment. But it is also a tool that increases the liquidity and marketability of the
debt. As such, its real benefit is in the additional option it gives debtors, creditors, and
their governments in developing a global solution to the debt crisis.
214 See Meltzer, supra note 9, at 7.
21 Debs, supra note 67, at 12; see Layman & Kearney, supra note 20, at 36
(noting that bank credit became the single most important form of new financing in the
early eighties and discussing the cost of such heavy reliance on development projects
and balance-of-payments deficits); see also Feinberg, supra note 12, at 5 (stating that
banks have become the most important source of financing for imports and investment
in developing countries); Brainard, supra note 33, at 33 (charting the share of commer-
cial bank borrowing in the current account financing of non-oil developing countries
from 1974 to 1983).
An advantage of foreign direct investment is that an inflow of intangible resources
often accompanies the transfer of financial resources. These include "managerial know-
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principle should not be lost by allowing banks to take advantage of
swaps for their own portfolios. Since both banks and debtors have lim-
ited debt available for debt/equity swaps, too much bank participa-
tion could limit the access of traditional private investors to nonfinan-
cial enterprises. This would not reduce the reliance on banks as the
primary source of capital.
Finally, by acting as brokers, i.e., agents of private investors,
banks are able to recoup some of the discount on the debt while stimu-
lating new investment. Functioning as intermediaries, banks can both
benefit from and serve the original objectives of the conversion pro-
grams. By making debt-swapping for bank portfolios too advantageous,
regulators risk minimizing the banks' role in facilitating additional pri-
vate investment.
While it is important that banks be able to use debt/equity con-
versions as a mechanism for debt reduction, the scheme should not be
viewed as a complete solution. The real contribution of such conver-
sions should be the increased liquidity and marketability they give to
the debt. By increasing the flexibility of bank portfolios, the conversions
change banks' perception of the debt. They thus become an important
tool in the rescheduling process. Restrictions are necessary to prevent
bank entrance into nonfinancial activities from subverting the goals of
the conversion programs and jeopardizing the solvency of the U.S. fi-
nancial system.
6.2. Limited Liberalization
While total deregulation may not be the answer, the Amendments
do provide some deregulation.2"' The August Amendment gave the
banks much freedom in terms of the permissible size of investments.
Yet it restricted both the types of nonfinancial companies in which a
bank could invest as well as the period in which the bank could hold
the investments. The February Amendment is more successful in bal-
how, technology and training opportunities for local workers; and access to global pro-
duction and marketing systems." Layman & Kearney, supra note 20, at 41. But cf. id.
at 42 (noting the obstacles to a favorable investment climate, e.g., overvalued exchange
rates, lack of access to imported capital goods and other inputs; unrealistic domestic
wages and labor market rigidities; price and market controls on outputs; and restric-
tions on repatriation of earnings).
218 For the banks, this is because the sale of debt would entail losses, even for
those heavily reserved.
217 While one immediate objective is to allow banks more flexibility in adjusting
their portfolios, the ultimate objectives encompass the need for greater flexibility, li-
quidity, and security in the financial system. Cf Feinberg, supra note 12, at 19 (citing
proposed new schemes which reflect banks' increased interest in flexibility, liquidity
and security).
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ancing the freedom of banks to engage in debt/equity swaps with the
restrictions necessary to discourage speculative and risky behavior.
The February Amendment corrects several problems presented by
the August Amendment. First, it contains a more liberal analog to the
dpc provision, providing the additional flexibility needed by the banks
without compromising the principal concerns behind the troubled debt
restructurings. This feature lessens the tension between the short-term
"bail-out" nature of the dpc provisions and the more long-term conse-
quences of the debt/equity conversions, while leaving the structure and
policy of the dpc analog intact.
As a temporary recoupment measure, the dpc arrangement works
effectively in a two-party situation when a debtor cannot make a timely
payment. It works less effectively when a debt is being serviced accord-
ing to its scheduled or rescheduled terms even though it is not collect-
able. Its effectiveness is further diminished when the debt is exchanged
for third-party property whose value is intended to increase with time.
Given the time period of the private agreement, demanding divestiture
before the equity interest has attained its full maturity diminishes the
value of the bargain. Extending the divestiture provision to coincide
with those provided by the individual foreign programs might make the
debt/equity conversions more attractive and workable for banks, with-
out implicating bank solvency.
Second, the February Amendment allows banks at least the flexi-
bility for conversions afforded by the debtor countries. Debt/equity
conversions broaden the framework within which reschedulings can oc-
cur. One of the means by which debtors generally obtain beneficial
rescheduling agreements is by offering concessions in other areas. In the
context of debt/equity conversions, debtors may offer the opportunity
for substantial investments in exchange for favorable restructuring
agreements. The increased liquidity of the debt, and the chance to swap
debt for an investment in a nonfinancial company in a productive sector
of the debtor economy, might make the bank more amenable to debt
capitalization or interest rate concessions. Allowing banks to convert
sovereign debt for equity interests in nonfinancial private sector compa-
nies offers the banks more attractive opportunities without jeopardizing
their financial soundness.21
Moreover, increasing bank deregulation in the domestic context
suggests that judicial attitudes towards the role of banks have changed.
A recent decision by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit up-
held an order of the Federal Reserve that allows banks to engage in
218 See supra notes 138-59 and accompanying text.
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limited securities activities through wholly-owned subsidiaries.219 Be-
cause there were provisions limiting the scope of this activity, the Court
ruled that the order did not violate the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933.220
The decision suggests some judicial support for limited bank involve-
ment in securities.
The February Amendment effectively recognizes the need to fur-
ther liberalize the divestiture and the privatization restrictions. In both
these provisions, the economic advantages offered by increased liberali-
zation are more important than the policy concerns behind the
limitations.
The provisions encompassing fundamental safety and soundness
concerns must remain in the February Amendment as reminders that
debt/equity swaps should not be used as a means of entrance into non-
financial activities. The provisions governing private sector investment,
the bank holding company provision, the notice requirement, and the
general consent limits safeguard the banks from the instabilities of the
marketplace and the debtor countries. The Amendments allow banks
the advantage of equity accounting while preventing over-involvement
in nonfinancial endeavors. With these regulations permitting banks ef-
fective but controlled participation, debt/equity swaps facilitate private
arrangements and restore flexibility to the restructuring process.
7. CONCLUSION
Seven years after the beginning of the debt crisis, developing coun-
tries are still futilely scrambling to rebuild their economies while main-
taining debt payments. Banks are gradually building up their loan-loss
reserves and decreasing their vulnerability to suspensions of payments.
But they are still reluctant to lend new money. After numerous restruc-
turings, both parties are in need of new options to manage the global
2"9 Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Federal Reserve System, 839 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1988)
cert. denied, 108 S.Ct. 2830 (1988). This decision functionally allowed banks to under-
write and deal in certain securities, although it limited the scope of their involvement.
See Squiers, Bank Affiliates Allowed to Deal in Securities, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 10, 1988, at
1.
220 The order did not violate Glass-Steagall because § 20 of the Act, which pro-
hibits affiliations of banks with entities engaged principally in underwriting and securi-
ties dealing, is ambiguous as to the meaning of the term "securities." The issue was
whether securities meant governmental securities (in which banks can deal) or bank-
ineligible securities, such as municipal reserve bonds, mortgage-related securities, and
commercial paper. The Board held that "securities" meant the latter. The court upheld
the Board's interpretation as consistent with the Congressional scheme. The Board's
qualitative and quantitative interpretation of "engaged principally," and thus their lim-
itation on the activity of bank affiliates, was also upheld. Securities Indus. Ass'n v.
Federal Reserve System, 839 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1988).
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debt crisis.
Debt/equity conversions offer one such alternative. By decreasing
bank exposure and encouraging investment in developing countries, the
swaps can be a useful mechanism. The Amendments to Regulation K
have sought to use the debt/equity programs in the foreign context as
the troubled debt restructurings were used in the domestic context. Ac-
cordingly, the Amendments broadened the framework within which
banks may swap debt for equity.
The Amendments to Regulation K are an important symbolic step.
They are a signal to banks and to Congress of the Board's dissatisfac-
tion with the status quo. They reflect the Board's recognition that the
debt cannot be collected and that new options must be explored. The
practical effect of the August Amendment was limited. The conflicting
provisions within it resulted in an economic stalemate. Allowing the
banks to maintain up to 100% equity ownership in a nonfinancial com-
pany appeared to be a great liberalization. The corresponding provi-
sions regarding divestiture and the type of nonfinancial equity that
could be acquired, however, negated the economic incentives they were
designed to create. The February Amendment, heeding bank commen-
tary and market realities, went further, permitting sizeable investment
in private-sector companies and more realistic divestiture provisions.
While the August Amendment fell short of encouraging bank participa-
tion in debt/equity programs, it initiated the debate that led to the Feb-
ruary Amendment. The latter Amendment has gone far in reducing the
regulatory barriers to debt/equity swaps.2 '
221 A. Quale, supra note 62, at 353.
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